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FOREWORD 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in Finland in the 
disability pension schemes of other European countries. The Finnish 
Centre for Pensions has experienced this as a growing demand for 
information on foreign schemes. This gave us the idea to invite foreign 
specialists to tell us about the trends of disability pensions in their 
countries. The seminar on Current Trends in Disability Pensions in Europe 
took place in Helsinki on 8th April 2003. Close to a hundred Finnish and 
foreign experts from the fields of disability administration and research 
participated in the seminar.   
This report contains the contributions presented at the seminar. We 
were fortunate to have excellent speakers from five different countries. 
Christopher Prinz presented a recent comparative study on disability 
policies in the OECD countries. The report searches for new policy 
orientations aiming at transforming disability into ability. Peter Wright 
described the recent changes in the UK from a historical point of view. 
Philip de Jong gave us an economic-policy outlook of the developments of 
disability pensions in the Netherlands. Catarina Svärd described the new 
disability pension system in Sweden from an administrative point of view. 
Timo Aro presented the Finnish view of work ability and functional 
capacity. 
Our thanks are due to the speakers of the seminar for their 
presentations as well as for their contributions to this publication. We also 
like to thank Anja Kallio for the technical editing of the report and Janina 
Gröndahl and Maria Lindholm for editing the English language.  
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9OPENING REMARKS OF THE 
DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND 
LABOUR MARKET CONTEXTS OF 
DISABILITY PENSIONS 
Uusitalo Hannu 
 
Pension policy in Europe is in transition. This is not only true in the 
European Union Member States but also in the Central and East Euro-
pean countries, where the driving forces of change are partly different. In 
the EU countries, the major causes and motivations for reform are well 
known. The European population is ageing. Dependency ratios, that is the 
number of people over 65 in relation to the number of people in the 
economically active age group, are forecast to increase, although the pace 
and magnitude of this increase  varies across countries. The growth in  
pension expenditure will accelerate, and the financing of pensions in a 
sustainable way has become a major pension policy issue. At the same 
time, the new challenges of providing pensions for atypical (part-time, 
temporary and self-employed workers) and mobile workers require new 
solutions. In the labour market, most European countries are now plagued 
by unemployment, but there is a growing concern that we may face a  
shortage of labour in coming decades.  
Although pension reforms are decided and carried out nationally, in-
ternational impulses and pressures, such as globalisation and intensified 
competition, are more important than ever. At the same time, the EU has 
assumed the role of facilitator of pension reforms by its open method of 
coordination. This method has recently been applied to pension policies 
along with some other policy areas, such as social exclusion and health 
care, and the coordination will continue in the future. In this process, the 
EU has agreed on eleven common objectives for national pension policies 
under the three headings: safeguarding the capacity of the systems to 
meet their social objectives, maintaining their financial sustainability, and 
meeting changing societal needs. In the long run, the open method of 
coordination may prove to be more significant than most of us assumed 
when this process started.  
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In many countries, disability pensions are an important and some-
times a major route  to early retirement. When pension reforms are on the 
political agenda, so are disability pensions. Therefore, it is only natural 
that the interest in disability pensions and their changes in different 
countries have increased considerably during recent years, in Europe in 
general as well as here in Finland. In Finland, the Parliament has recently 
passed legislation on a major reform of the statutory earnings-related 
pensions, which comes into effect in 2005. An important part of this reform 
relates to early retirement schemes. A number of EU countries (such as 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, Luxembourg, Austria, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom) have reviewed, or are in the process of 
reviewing, their disability pension schemes with a view to making the 
conditions for granting a disability pension stricter, strengthening rehabili-
tation measures, and offering suitable alternative work instead of granting 
a pension.  
 
Labour force participation of older workers 
Raising employment levels is one of the major means that the EU has 
outlined in order to increase the sustainability of pension systems. The 
Lisbon and Stockholm European Councils have set an ambitious employ-
ment goal of raising the older workers’ (55-64) employment rate to 50 per 
cent from its current level of 38.5  per cent. The variation between the 
Member States is considerable. Figure 1 shows that in Sweden, the older 
workers’ employment rate is at its own level, two-thirds of the Swedes in 
this age group are employed (although very often off work because of 
illness). At the other end, we find Belgium and Luxembourg where only 
one out of four in this age range is employed. Finland takes the sixth 
place, clearly above the EU average, but below the Lisbon and Stockholm 
targets. 
This variation is largely due to differences in the employment rates 
of women. Among men, national variation is smaller. While it is clear that 
disability pensions are not in a major role in raising the employment rates 
of older workers, they are one factor  towards which attention should be 
directed. 
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Source: Joint report by the Commission and the Council on Adequate and  
 Sustainable Pensions, 2003. 
 
Figure 1. Older workers’ (55-64) employment rates in the EU countries,  
 2001, %.  
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Disability expenditure 
Countries differ greatly as regards their disability policies. There is also 
considerable variation as regards public disability expenditure. The OECD 
study carried out by Christopher Prinz displayed such variation (Trans-
forming Disability 2003, 17), but because Finland was not included in the 
OECD study, we use the EU statistics to illustrate these differences. 
Figure 2 shows disability expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 1999.  
 
Source: Social Protection in Europe 2001. European Commission 2002. 
 
Figure 2. Disability expenditure, % of GDP, 1999. 
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The data in Figure 2 are based on the European  system of integrat-
ed social protection statistics (Esspros), provided by Eurostat. Disability 
expenditure includes income maintenance and support in cash or kind 
(except health care)  for people with physical or mental disabilities who are 
unable to engage in economic and social activities. It also includes  
disability pensions, and the provision of goods and services (other than 
medical care) to the disabled. There are problems of comparability, but at 
least some provisional conclusions can be made. 
Disability expenditure as a proportion of GDP varies from less than 
one per cent of GDP in Ireland to nearly four per cent in Sweden. The 
proportion of Finland’s GDP spent  on disability programmes is the second 
highest in the EU. The Nordic countries are heavy spenders, while the 
Southern European countries1 and Ireland are thriftier in this spending. In 
any case, disability expenditure accounts for a significant proportion of the 
national income, especially here in the North, and therefore – in addition to 
employment – disability issues deserve attention in social and economic 
policies.  
 
The Finnish pension reform 2005 
The legislated  reform of the private-sector pensions in Finland will  have 
consequences for the disability pensions. Two types of early retirement 
pensions will be abolished: the individual early retirement pension – a 
special disability pension for ageing employees – and the unemployment 
pension. As a partial compensation for the abolition of the individual early 
retirement pension, it has been agreed that in the assessment of work 
ability, special attention will be paid  to “the vocational character of the 
disability in such cases where the work career is long and weariness and 
fatigue due to work together with ageing make continued work immoder-
ate”. 
Furthermore, the age limit for the part-time pension will be raised to 
58 years in 2003 for persons born in 1947 or later, and the old-age 
 
1 Portugal is an exception, but this may be due to the fact that disability expenditure includes 
pensions paid to the disabled who have reached retirement age.  In other countries, such pen-
sions are included in the pension expenditure. 
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pension accrual will decrease during part-time pension. Instead of the 
current four routes to early retirement, there will be only two: the disability 
pension and the part-time pension. As a preventive measure, a statutory 
right to vocational rehabilitation is established in cases where illness, 
defect or injury poses a threat to work ability within the next five years.  
Early retirement pensions are the major route to retirement in 
Finland. In the private sector, about 61,500 employees retired in 2002, 
and 11,000 of these retired on an ordinary old-age pension. It may be a 
surprise to many that the disability pension is the most common first 
pension benefit in Finland. For 21,000 private-sector employees, the 
disability pension was the first pension benefit in 2002. The unemployment 
pension is also more common than the ordinary old-age pension as a first 
pension benefit: over 11,000 private-sector employees retired on an 
unemployment pension in 2002. Among the 55-64-year-olds, the unem-
ployment pension is the most common route of retirement, and the 
disability pension comes next (Figure 3). 
 
Source: Finnish Centre for Pensions. 
 
Figure 3. The number of retired employees (first pension benefit) in the private  
 sector according to pension type, 2002.  
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proportion to the employees in the same age group, has increased in 
Finland in all age groups after 1998. The strong declining trend, which 
started in the latter part of the 1980s, has turned into growth (Figure 4). 
Although this increase is quite modest, the pension reform will further 
increase pressure towards disability pensions. 
 
Source: Finnish Centre for Pensions. 
 
Figure 4. Incidence of new disability pensions in the private sector, 1980-2002. 
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the current scheme, are expected to continue  in work until the age of 60 
(Gould 2002). Similarly, the abolition of unemployment pensions will partly 
increase pressure towards disability pensions, while it also improves the 
rate of employment among the  ageing labour force (Rantala 2002). Not 
surprisingly, similar pressures towards disability pension schemes are  
increased by the changes in the part-time pension scheme, although the 
main effect is assumed to be  continuation  in full-time work (Takala 2002). 
In brief, since the demographic, labour market, economic and finan-
cial contexts of disability pensions are changing, there are good reasons 
to focuse on disability pensions. This is why the Finnish Centre for 
Pensions decided  to arrange this seminar on disability pensions.  
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DISABILITY POLICY SYSTEMS IN 
OECD COUNTRIES IN NEED OF 
REFORM 
Christopher Prinz 
Introduction 
How the OECD countries can reconcile the twin, but potentially contradic-
tory, goals of disability policy has yet to be resolved. One goal is to ensure 
that disabled citizens are not excluded from society: that they are encour-
aged and empowered to participate as fully as possible in economic and 
social life, and in particular to engage in gainful employment, and that they 
are not ousted from the labour market too easily and too early. The other 
goal is to ensure that those who are disabled or who become disabled 
have income security: that they are not denied the means to live decently 
because of disabilities which restrict their earning potential. 
The OECD has recently completed a systematic analysis of a wide 
array of labour market and social protection programmes aimed at people 
with disabilities. By analysing the relationship between policies and 
outcomes across twenty OECD countries, it gives the reader a better 
understanding of the dilemmas of disability policy and of successful policy 
elements or packages.1 The study concludes that a promising new 
disability policy approach should move closer to the philosophy of 
unemployment programmes by:  
- emphasising activation;  
- promoting tailored early intervention;  
- removing disincentives to work;  
- introducing a culture of mutual obligations; and,  
- involving employers.  
 
1 The following twenty countries have participated in this comparative review of working-age 
disability policies and outcomes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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The study finds that many countries’ policies already include some 
elements that are important components in such a new approach. 
In the following, the main empirical and analytical findings and the 
key policy conclusions of the recent OECD report “Transforming Disability 
into Ability – Policies to Promote Work and Income Security for Disabled 
People” are highlighted.  
 
Empirical evidence 
Working-age disability policies target a large and heterogeneous group 
(Figure 1). One-third of this group has severe disabilities, and people with 
congenital disabilities are a small minority. The diversity of this group is at 
the root of most of the policy challenges that face policy makers attempt-
ing to improve the living conditions of disabled people. 
 
Disability prevalence, by severity of disability, as a percentage of 20-64 population, late 1990s 
Note: Sum of “Severe” and “Moderate” for Canada, Mexico, Poland, Switzerland, and unweighted 
averages. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
 
Figure 1. Average disability prevalence of 14 %, of which one-third are severely 
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Income security is high in many OECD countries: the income levels 
of households containing disabled people are generally broadly similar to 
that of the population as a whole (Figure 2). The relative economic well-
being of households is correlated with the structure of the disability benefit 
system and the benefit level paid: countries with individual benefit 
entitlements for the entire disabled population (i.e. full population cover-
age) and high earnings-related insurance benefits have the highest 
relative incomes of disabled people, while those with a strong focus on 
means-tested programmes have the lowest – but public spending on 
benefits is considerably lower in the latter group. 
 
Relative average income of disabled over non-disabled, for persons  and households with a disabled 
person, late 1990s 
 
Notes: Countries are ranked in decreasing order of the ratio of equivalised incomes of households with 
a disabled person over those without. No personal income data for Korea and Poland, and no 
household income data for Australia and Mexico. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
 
Figure 2. Successful economic intergration in many but not in all countries.  
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people who have a job are almost as high as average work income of 
people without disabilities (Figure 3). Disabled people without a job have 
considerably lower personal financial resources. 
 
Relative average personala income from work of disabled over non-disabled persons who work, late 
1990s 
Note: Countries are ranked in decreasing order of the ratio. 
a) Equivalised household income for Poland and Switzerland. 
b) Australia: median income instead of average income. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
 
Figure 3. Little difference in work incomes between disabled and non-disabled  
 persons.  
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income for a considerable proportion of the working-age disabled popula-
tion (either early or regular retirement, depending on the country). 
Unemployment benefits play a much less important role overall, despite 
relatively high non-employment rates among this group. 
Perhaps surprisingly, recognising oneself as severely disabled does 
not necessarily imply receiving a disability benefit and vice versa. Many 
people on disability benefits do not claim to have a disability, while at the 
same time, many people who subjectively classify themselves as severely 
disabled and do not work receive no benefits. 
 
Table 1. Higher relative employment rates for persons of prime working age and  
 with higher educational attainment.  
 
Relative employment rate of disabled over non-disabled persons, by age group, gender and 
educational attainment, late 1990s 
 
Age group Gender Educational attainmentAll 
 
Age 20-64 20-49 50-64 Men Women Lower Higher 
 
Australia 0.55 0.66 0.45 0.54 0.56 .. .. 
Austria 0.60 0.85 0.55 0.60 0.59 0.49 0.67 
Belgium 
 
0.54 0.73 0.30 0.59 0.52 0.46 0.64 
Canada 0.72 0.80 0.62 0.71 0.73 0.64 0.77 
Denmark 0.61 0.74 0.42 0.61 0.62 0.44 0.73 
France 0.72 0.83 0.67 0.75 0.69 0.71 0.83 
 
Germany 
0.67 0.84 0.65 0.69 0.62 0.57 0.71 
Italy 0.60 0.84 0.52 0.59 0.63 0.48 1.02 
Korea 0.74 0.82 0.66 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.89 
 
Mexico 
0.77 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Netherlands 0.60 0.70 0.52 0.61 0.64 0.55 0.63 
Norway 0.72 0.81 0.62 .. .. .. .. 
 
Poland 
0.29 0.32 0.35 .. .. .. .. 
Portugal 0.59 0.70 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.58 0.85 
Spain 0.41 0.53 0.36 0.43 0.37 0.41 0.57 
 
Sweden 
0.69 0.78 0.56 0.77 0.64 0.64 0.72 
Switzerland 0.79 0.87 0.68 0.84 0.75 .. .. 
 
United Kingdom 
0.53 0.64 0.42 0.51 0.56 0.41 0.65 
United States 0.58 0.66 0.48 0.55 0.61 0.40 0.66 
 
OECD (19) 
 
0.62 
 
.. 
 
.. 
 
.. 
 
.. 
 
.. 
 
.. 
OECD (14)a 0.61 0.75 0.52 0.62 0.61 0.54 0.74 
EU (11) 0.60 0.74 0.50 0.61 0.59 0.52 0.73 
 
..   Data not available. 
a)  Age, gender or educational attainment not available for Australia, Mexico, Norway, Poland and  
 Switzerland. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
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The impact of benefit systems 
Disability benefit recipiency rates are high in many countries (Figure 4). 
Nonetheless, the majority of people with disabilities (disabled according to 
self-assessment) do not report receipt of such benefits. Growth in 
disability benefit recipiency slowed recently. This is explained by reforms 
affecting benefit access, which have led to a stabilisation or even a decline 
in annual rates of benefit inflow in most countries, in particular since 
1995.2
Disability benefit recipiency rates in 1999 by benefit programme, percentage of 20-64 population, 
 late 1990s 
 Note: The rate corrected for persons receiving both contributory and non-contributory benefits, exept  
 for Canada (unknown). 
 a) Contributory and non-contributory benefits. 
 b) Excluding Mexico, Korea and Turkey. 
 Source: OECD (2003). “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
 
Figure 4. Disability benefit recipiency rate concentrated at 5 to 7 %.  
 
2 In this study, the term (disability) benefit recipiency is used to denote the number of people 
on disability benefits, while the term (disability) benefit inflow refers to the annual inflow into 
disability benefits. Disability prevalence, finally, is the share of disabled people in the working-
age population. 
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Outflow from disability benefits is very low in virtually all countries, 
despite considerable cross-country differences in regulations on reviewing 
entitlements, the availability of partial benefits, work incentives, etc. 
(Figure 5). This is one reason why disability benefit recipiency rates have 
been rising. The low outflow partly reflects that regulations on reviewing 
benefit entitlements are not stringently applied and that there is a low take-
up of work incentives. 
 
Annual rates of outflow from disability benefits, 1995 and 1999, percentages 
Note: Countries are ranked in decreasing order of the 1999 rate. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
 
Figure 5. Low outflow rates from disability benefits.  
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ments and partly to failing the (household) means test. In countries with a 
dual benefit system, i.e. insurance benefits for the labour force and 
means-tested disability benefits for those not qualifying for insurance 
benefits, the increasing proportion of recipients on means-tested benefits 
indicates an aggravation of this problem (Figure 6). 
 
Proportion of disability benefit recipients on non-contributory benefit  (only countries with a dual benefit 
system) 
Note: Countries are ranked in increasing order of the 1999 share. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
 
Figure 6. General increase in share of recipients on non-contributory benefits.  
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Women are generally under-represented on insurance programmes 
and over-represented on means-tested benefit programmes. This is not 
the case in some schemes with individual entitlement for the entire 
disabled population, in which women below age 45 have much higher 
inflow rates than men (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Very different gender pattern in inflows.  
 
Ratio of female over male  inflow rates in 1999, by age group 
 
20-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 20-64 
 
Australia 0,52 0.61 0.87 0.76 0.17 0.60 
Austria 0.81 0.79 0.59 0.24 x 0.39 
Canada 0.95 1.14 0.98 0.75 0.58 0.88 
 
Denmark 
 
0.78 
 
1.21 
 
1.38 
 
1.18 
 
1.67 
 
1.26 
France 0.65 0.92 0.84 0.62 x 0.72 
Germany 0.82 0.80 0.72 0.54 0.19 0.51 
 
Italy 
 
0.42 
 
0.51 
 
0.47 
 
0.35 
 
0.10 
 
0.39 
Mexico 0.36 0.31 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.20 
Netherlands 2.25 1.31 0.96 0.52 0.49 1.19 
 
Norway 
 
1.25 
 
1.57 
 
1.54 
 
1.24 
 
0.98 
 
1.33 
Poland 0.56 0.83 0.75 0.15 0.14 0.65 
Portugal 0.79 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.95 
 
Sweden 
 
1.40 
 
1.64 
 
1.45 
 
1.20 
 
1.00 
 
1.27 
Switzerland 1.01 1.13 1.21 0.98 0.31 0.93 
 
United Kingdom 
 
0.88 
 
0.81 
 
0.74 
 
0.62 
 
x 0.63 
United States 0.82 0.88 0.85 0.72 0.56 0.79 
 
OECD (16) 
 
0.89 
 
0.96 
 
0.91 
 
0.68 
 
0.56 
 
0.79 
 
Netherlands (nc) 
 
1.00 
 
0.79 
 
0.72 
 
0.86 
 
0.81 
 
0.90 
United Kingdom (nc) 0.72 0.77 0.79 0.70 3.54 0.76 
United States (nc) 0.95 1.13 1.12 1.15 1.14 1.12 
 
x Retirement age for either women, or men and women, 60 years.  
nc: Non-contributory programme in a dual benefit system. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
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Mental and psychological problems are responsible for between 
one-quarter and one-third of the disability benefit recipiency levels, and for 
a considerable portion of the increase in these levels (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. One in three disability benefits due to mental conditions.  
 
Proportion of mental illness in disability benefit stock and inflow 
 
Stock 
 
Inflow  
 1990 1995 1999 1990 1995 1999 
Australia (nc) .. .. 31 .. .. 32 
Austria 9 10 .. 10 11 17 
Canada 11 16 21 10 17 25 
France .. .. .. .. .. 27 
Germany .. .. .. 17 23 28 
Netherlands 27 31 30 30 26 33 
 non-contritutory 36 39 46 63 53 52 
Norway 28 29 29 20 23 25 
Sweden 24 26 .. 16 20 24 
Switzerland 34 36 39 .. .. 34 
United Kingdom 16 17 23 13 18 26 
 non-contritutory .. 40 37 .. 31 35 
United States 27 31 31 21 23 22 
 non-contritutory 53 58 59 41 42 40 
 
OECD (10) - - 35 - - 32 
 
nc: non-contritutory 
..    Data not available. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
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Application rates for benefits differ less across countries than do in-
flow rates. Benefit rejection rates vary considerably between countries, 
and are highest in countries with the lowest inflows (Table 4). Rates of 
successful appeal against benefit rejection, which are increasing in 
several countries, tend to be higher in countries with low rejection rates, 
indicating considerable differences in assessment procedures. 
In a cross-country perspective, there is little evidence that high or in-
creasing unemployment leads to high or increasing levels of disability 
benefit recipiency, while there is some indication that stricter access to 
disability benefits results in somewhat higher unemployment levels. There 
is also no evidence on programme interchangeability between early 
retirement benefits and disability benefits. On the contrary, countries in 
which the disability scheme is predominantly used by older workers tend 
to be countries with large numbers on early retirement programmes. 
 
Table 4. Large differences in benefit rejection rates.  
 
Proportion of rejected benefit applicants and of successful appeals 
 
Share of rejections among total 
applications 
 
Share of successful appeals 
among rejected applicants 
 1990 1995 1999 1990 1995 1999 
Australia  .. .. 31 .. .. 6 
Austria 39 44 49 19 14 11 
 
Canada 
 
42 
 
51 
 
55 
 
.. 
 
14 
 
11 
Denmark 15 13 25 47 64 51 
France .. .. 25 .. .. .. 
 
Germany 
 
32 
 
34 
 
38 
 
.. 
 
.. 
 
.. 
Italy .. 69 68 .. .. .. 
Korea 30 10 23 1 3 3 
 
Netherlands 
 
21 
 
42 
 
37 
 
41 
 
63 
 
12 
Norway 12 17 17 23 25 26 
 
Portugal 
 
.. 
 
48 
 
46 
 
.. 
 
11 
 
14 
Spain .. .. 44 .. .. 8 
 
United States 
 
56 
 
52 
 
48 
 
.. 
 
.. 
 
.. 
United States (nc) 68 66 64 .. .. .. 
 
OECD (13) .. .. 39 .. .. 16 
 
..    Data not available. 
nc: non-contributory benefits only. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
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Considerable age profiling is apparent in disability benefit pro-
grammes. In many countries, disability benefit awards are highly concen-
trated among people over age 45 (Table 5). This reflects the age pattern 
of disability prevalence, at least in part. However, taking this age structure 
into account, some countries turn out to have particularly high rates of 
benefit inflow among younger disabled people. 
 
Table 5. Persons aged 45 and over dominate the disability benefit rolls.  
 
Proportion of persons aged 45 and over in disability benefit stock and inflow, percentages 
 
Stock 
 
Inflow  
 1990 1995 1999 1990 1995 1999 
Australia (nc) .. 68 67 .. .. 61 
Austria 91 92 92 89 91 85 
Belgium 76 73 72 .. .. .. 
Canada 88 84 84 80 75 75 
Denmark (nc) 88 87 87 85 80 79 
France .. .. .. .. .. 85 
Germany 94 91 89 91 86 85 
Italy 98 97 97 ,, 88 88 
Korea 34 58 69 .. .. .. 
Mexico 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Netherlands 72 78 75 45 44 46 
 non-contritutory 17 16 19 .. .. 21 
Norway 79 79 78 77 72 74 
Poland .. 74 78 .. 59 64 
Portugal 90 91 92 88 87 89 
 non-contributory 45 35 .. 30 16 .. 
Spain 94 92 91 .. 86 84 
 non-contributory .. 54 52 .. .. .. 
Sweden 82 72 71 85 78 75 
Switzerland 68 67 67 .. .. 69 
United Kingdom 77 76 75 65 62 60 
 non-contritutory 49 45 46 .. 39 40 
United States 71 70 73 65 67 69 
 non-contritutory .. 59 63 62 63 67 
 
OECD (19) .. .. 76 .. .. 70 
 
nc: non-contritutory benefits only. 
..    Not available. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
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The impact of employment policies 
Even more striking is the age bias in integration programmes. Vocational 
rehabilitation and training is predominantly offered to people below age 
45, thus partly explaining the age bias in the disability benefit programme, 
but sheltered and supported-type employment programmes also tend to 
benefit mostly young severely disabled people (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Few disabled persons aged 45 and over in active programmes.  
 
Propotion of persons aged 45 and over among persons in rehabilitation and employment 
programmers, percentages, 1999 
 
Vocational 
rehabilitation
Subsidised 
employment
Supported 
employment 
Sheltered 
employment 
For compari-
son: share in  
disability 
benefit inflow 
 
Australia 
 
.. 
 
.. 
 
11 
 
20 
 
61 
Austria 14 .. .. 24 85 
Belgium .. .. .. 19 .. 
Denmark 20 47 .. .. 79 
France .. 55 .. .. 85 
Germany .. 51 .. .. 85 
Netherlands 32 .. .. .. 46 
Norway 26 30 11 41 74 
Portugal 3 .. .. 8 89 
Spain .. 24 .. 18 84 
Switzerland 13 .. .. .. 69 
United States 25 .. .. .. 69 
 
.. Data not available. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
 
While the approach to vocational rehabilitation and training differs 
markedly between countries, this type of intervention is usually used too  
little, and often initiated too late (Figure 7). More can be done to involve 
the employers in this process. The average per capita cost for vocational 
rehabilitation and training is low compared with the average cost of a 
disability benefit. Provided that such intervention secures permanent 
employment, investments should pay off within a short period. 
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Stock in vocational rehabilitation as a ratio of disability benefits inflowsa, percentages, 1999 
Note: Countries are ranked in decreasing order of the ratio of vocational rehabilitation over benefit 
inflow. 
a) Contributory disability benefit, exept non-countributory disability scheme for Australia and Denmark. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
 
Figure 7. More people are awarded a disability benefit than receive vocational 
 rehabilitation services.  
 
Countries differ markedly both in terms of the variety of special employ-
ment programmes for disabled people and the costs per participant. 
Where such programmes are permanent, in particular in sheltered 
employment, average costs can exceed the costs of per capita disability 
benefits. The types of employment programmes used have changed very 
slowly. While sheltered employment is increasingly seen as inappropriate 
and in need of being replaced by supported employment-type initiatives, 
empirically the protected sector remains as important as ever (Table 7).3
3 In this study, supported employment is defined as any form of personal assistance given at 
a workplace (on-the-job coaching or training) and granted to the employer or the employee. 
Sheltered employment is defined as employment in a segregated environment, be it in a spe-
cial workshop or a social firm or in a protected job or segment in the open labour market. 
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Table 7. Large variation in focus and type of employment programmes.  
 
Persons in special employment programmes for disabled persons per 1000 of the  
 population, 1999 
 
All employment 
programmes 
Subsidised  
employment 
Supported  
employment 
Sheltered  
Employment 
 
Australia 3.4 0.2 1.6 1.5 
Austria 7.0 3.6 0.7 2.7 
Belgium 3.6 0.7 0.0 2.9 
 
Denmark 
 
5.9 
 
3.0 
 
0.6 
 
2.4 
France 9.5 6.3 b 3.2 
Germany 4.1 0.2 0.6 3.3 
 
Italy 
 
0.8 
 
0.3 
 
b 0.6 
Korea 0.3 0.1 0,0 0.2 
Netherlands 9.2 b a 9.2 
 
Norway 
 
7.2 
 
2.4 
 
0.5 
 
4.3 
Poland          12.1 2.0 x          10.1 
Portugal 0.2 0.1 x 0.1 
 
Spain 
 
1.2 
 
0.6 
 
x 0.6 
Sweden          16.2          10.8 0.2 5.2 
Switzerland 5.6 x x 5.6 
 
United Kingdom 
 
1.2 
 
0.5 
 
0.7 
 
a
United States 1.1 b 1.1 A 
 
OECD (17) 5.2 .. .. .. 
 
x No such programme up to the present. 
a) Significant programme, no data available. 
b) Minor programme, no data available. 
Source: OECD (2003), “Transforming Disability into Ability”, Paris. 
 
Different employment policy approaches seem to have similar effects. 
While legislative approaches to employment promotion differ in many 
respects (rights-based, obligations-based, incentives-based), all ap-
proaches tend to benefit people already in employment much more than 
those who are out of work and looking for a job. Proper sanctions on 
employers not fulfilling their obligations and adequate instruments to 
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enforce these sanctions are crucial for an effective employment promotion 
policy. 
Variation in the employment rates of disabled people across partici-
pating countries is strongly correlated with variation in the employment 
rates of non-disabled people. This suggests, first, that general labour 
market forces have a strong impact on the employment of people with 
disabilities and, second, that general employment-promoting policies also 
foster the employment of special groups in the labour force, such as 
people with reduced work ability. 
Finally, lessons from general active labour market policy analysis 
are largely applicable to the situation of people with disabilities. Some of 
the critique, e.g. regarding dead-weight or substitution effects, is less 
relevant, because of the permanent productivity loss of some groups of 
disabled people. Generally, it is necessary to balance measures affecting 
labour supply and labour demand. 
 
Policy conclusions 
No single country in this review can be said to have a particularly success-
ful policy for disabled people. Nevertheless, there are differences in 
outcomes that appear to be related to the policy choices that countries 
have made. From these observations, the following policy conclusions can 
be recommended. 
Recognise the status of disability independent of the work and in-
come situation. Societies need to change the way they think about 
disability and those affected by it. The term "disabled" should no longer be 
equated with "unable to work". Disability should be recognised as a 
condition but it should be distinct from eligibility for, and receipt of, 
benefits, just as it should not automatically be treated as an obstacle to 
work. The disability status, i.e. the medical condition and the resulting 
work ability, should be re-assessed at regular intervals. The recognised 
disability status should remain unaffected by the type and success of 
intervention unless a medical review certifies changes. 
Introduce a culture of mutual obligations. Most societies readily ac-
cept their obligation to make efforts to support and (re)integrate disabled 
persons, but it is less common to expect disabled persons themselves 
and, if applicable, their employers to contribute to the process as well. 
This change of paradigm will require fundamental rethinking and restruc-
turing of the legal and institutional framework of disability policy in many 
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countries. It will only be effective if it is accompanied by a change in the 
attitude of all those involved in disability issues. Note that the following 
three recommendations are to a varying degree related to this new culture 
of mutual obligations. 
Design individual work/benefit packages. Merely looking after the fi-
nancial needs of disabled people through cash benefits is insufficient; this 
would still leave many excluded from the labour market and sometimes 
even from society, more generally. Therefore, each disabled person 
should be entitled to a "participation package" adapted to individual needs 
and capacities. This package could contain rehabilitation and vocational 
training, job search support, work elements from a wide range of forms of 
employment (regular, part-time, subsidised, sheltered) and benefits in 
cash or in kind. It could also in, some circumstances, contain activities that 
are not strictly considered work but contribute to the social integration of 
the disabled person. 
Introduce new obligations for disabled people. Benefit receipt should 
in principle be conditional on participation in employment, vocational 
rehabilitation, and other integration measures. Active participation should 
be the counterpart to benefit receipt. Just as the assisting caseworker has 
a responsibility to help disabled persons find an occupation that corre-
sponds to their capacity, the disabled person is expected to make an effort 
to participate in the labour market. Failure to do so should result in benefit 
sanctions. Any such sanctions would need to be administered with due 
regard to the basic needs of the disabled person and those of dependent 
family members. Furthermore, sanctions would not be justified in any case 
where an appropriate integration strategy had not been devised, or proves 
impossible to formulate, e.g. because of the severity or acuteness of the 
disability. 
Involve employers in the process. Involving employers is crucial to 
the successful re-integration of disabled persons. Different approaches 
exist, ranging from moral suasion and anti-discrimination legislation to 
compulsory employment quotas. The effectiveness of the measures 
depends on the willingness of employers to help disabled persons stay in 
or enter work (which can be influenced through incentives aimed at raising 
labour demand), but also on the possibilities of circumventing legislation or 
paying the fines imposed for non-compliance. 
Promote early intervention. Early intervention can in many cases be 
the most effective measure against long-term benefit dependence. As 
soon as a person becomes disabled, a process of tailored vocational 
intervention should be initiated, where appropriate including, e.g. job 
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search, rehabilitation and/or further training. Where possible, such 
measures should be launched while the person is in an early stage of a 
disease or a chronic health problem. Preventive measures at the work-
place could even be delinked from being temporarily out of work. 
Make cash benefits a flexible policy element. The cash part of the 
work/benefit package needs to reflect the disabled person's capacity to 
work, but it also needs to take into account whether the person has 
actually been able to find a job. Thus, cash benefits would have to be 
available with sufficient flexibility to take account both of different cases of 
remaining work ability and of the evolution of an individual's disability 
status over time. In addition, benefit entitlements should be designed such 
that the disabled person is not penalised for taking up work. 
Reform programme administration. A more individual approach will 
place a wide range of new demands on disability gatekeepers, i.e. the 
people who administer entitlement for, and arrays of, active and passive 
interventions offered to a disabled person. Caseworkers will need an 
extensive knowledge of the range of available benefits and services. More 
time will be required to assist individuals and follow each case. Implemen-
tation of a one-stop approach will help gatekeepers to manage the full 
menu of available interventions, and promote equal access to all pro-
grammes for all people. 
Design disability programmes as active programmes. Often, disabil-
ity benefit systems function as early retirement programmes, providing a 
route for quasi-permanent exit from the labour market. Emphasising 
activation and the mutual obligations of both society and the disabled 
person moves disability policy closer to the underlying logic of unemploy-
ment programmes, which expect an active contribution and effort from 
beneficiaries. Unreformed disability programmes are likely to attract 
applicants who may find it difficult to comply with the stricter obligations of 
unemployment schemes. There is a need for a consistent strategy in 
disability and unemployment policy that extends the culture of mutual 
obligations to all labour market programmes. 
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DISABILITY PENSIONS IN 
GREAT BRITAIN 
Peter Wright 
 
The impulse to help fellow human beings unable to fend for themselves 
because of sickness or disability seems to be an inherent human charac-
teristic. Neanderthal skeletons show that some individuals in the earliest 
known settlements can only have survived with help from their families or 
neighbours (Rudgley 1998, 216–7). There is also, however, an equally 
inbuilt unwillingness to help those whose demands reflect failing to behave 
as society expects. This distinction is inherent in the mediaeval and 
renaissance divisions between a ‘deserving’ or ‘impotent’ poor, or those 
poor ‘by casualty’; contrasted with the ‘undeserving’, ‘able-bodied’ or ‘idle’ 
poor, sometimes referred to as ‘rogues and vagabonds’. Whilst terminol-
ogy and approaches have changed, this essential dichotomy has re-
mained at the heart of UK social policy. 
Prior to Tudor times, the established Roman Catholic Church sup-
ported the poor from tithes (a local tax based on the value of land, crops 
and herds collected by local rectors). The law of the church (canon law) 
therefore governed the system, rather than that of the state. Mediaeval 
canon law never resolved the issue of categorising the poor and the 
system of relieving them, because of conflicting theological approaches. 
Almost certainly, individual rectors decided eligibility, doubtless taking 
account of the views of their parishioners. 
 
First state interventions 
The state only stepped in when the church was, for one reason or another, 
unable to cope. The first state intervention followed the Black Death of 
1349. A third of the population died; there were severe labour shortages 
and resulting wage inflation, and the church itself lost many priests. The 
government introduced strict controls of wages, prices and contracts of 
employment (Ziegler 1969). Once the crisis was over, the old system 
returned. 
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It fell apart in the sixteenth century when the church (and its tithes) 
were reformed throughout northern Europe, and nationalised in England. 
Co-incidental rampant inflation induced economic dislocation and extreme 
social unrest in both Protestant and Catholic countries. Reform proposals 
centred on transferring responsibility for relief from the church to local 
authorities, and reducing costs by ensuring clear differentiation of the two 
classes of the poor. Tribunals with medical members to assess sickness 
and disability were first proposed in 1526, in work jointly commissioned by 
the city of Bruges and the English King Henry VIII (Vives in Salter1926). A 
series of English reforming Acts culminated in three measures: 
- The Poor Law Act of 1597 transferred the power to tax local  
citizens and relieve poverty from the church to elected local  
officials (the ‘Overseers of the Poor’); 
- The Statute of Artificers of 1563 re-introduced strict control of 
wages and regulated work contracts in an attempt to ensure a  
continuing supply of cheap agricultural labour; 
- The Vagrancy Act of 1597 set out those who were to be ’taken, 
adjudged and deemed Rogues, Vagabonds and Sturdy Beggars’ if 
found begging, and to be ‘stripped naked from the middle upwards, 
and be openly whipped until his or her body be bloody’ and then 
returned to their home parish, where they were to take a job. 
Similar developments in Catholic Europe revived debate on whether it was 
acceptable to classify the poor and restrict any from begging, and the 
faithful from giving them money. Eventually, a scheme proposed for the 
city of Ypres was referred to the Sorbonne as the guardians of canon law, 
and pronounced legal in 1531 provided that: 
- Ecclesiastical revenues were not confiscated;  
- Private individuals remained free to give to the poor if they wished, 
and could be encouraged to do so;  
- Begging was to be allowed if public funds might be insufficient to 
relieve poverty. 
On this basis, differentiating the treatment of the poor spread throughout 
Europe, encouraged by a Pragmatic Decree from the Emperor Charles V 
(Anon, Forma subventionis… 1926 in Salter). 
Ensuing centuries saw various minor changes to a system that es-
sentially continued until 1911 in England, and only finally disappeared in 
1948. Experience showed that inhuman punishment of the idle poor 
simply did not work, as St Thomas More had said ‘Neither ther is any 
punishment so horrible, that it can kepe them from stealynge, which have 
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no other craft, wherby to get their living (Lumby 1885). It was, neverthe-
less, repeatedly tried so that 'this part of English history look[s] like the 
history of the savages in America. Almost all severities have been 
inflicted, except scalping’ (Burn 1764, 120). On the other hand, making 
poor law relief thoroughly unpleasant by making it contingent upon 
entering workhouses deliberately run to be uncomfortable, could drive 
some of the poor into work. But, the main development was the recogni-
tion of cyclical economic depressions and resulting unemployment as a 
concomitant of the industrial revolution. Although the division of the idle 
and impotent poor remained a powerful model, this meant that an idle 
unemployed could only be defined if there were real opportunities to work, 
both in general terms and for the individual who fell to be classified. 
If Great Britain made no provision for a social security system be-
tween 1597 and 1911, individuals increasingly developed co-operative or 
friendly schemes to cover poverty due to sickness, disability or the costs 
of funerals by group savings. These particularly developed as Poor Law 
payments were reduced in the economic dislocation during and after the 
Napoleonic Wars. Parliament supported them by enacting appropriate 
base legislation, whilst resolutely refusing to enact any state social 
security scheme. It was the friendly schemes, together with the German 
guild system, which inspired Bismarck’s social security system in Ger-
many, though it was always more regulated by legislation than in Great 
Britain. 
 
The National Insurance Act 1911 
When Lloyd George introduced his national health insurance scheme in 
1911, he deliberately copied the German model. His scheme included 
general practitioner services free at the time of use, and allowed citizens 
to choose to register with any local general practitioner who then became 
‘their doctor’. They would also have a free choice of a number of ‘ap-
proved societies’ (consisting of the old friendly societies and commercial 
death benefits insurers) to which they would pay contributions set by the 
state, and who would then pay them at least minimum levels of benefits 
(also set in legislation) whilst they were sick or disabled. Although the 
insurer formally decided whether to pay benefit, a ‘certificate’ from the 
general practitioner actually established entitlement to benefit. The 
benefits consisted of a flat-rate "sickness benefit" payable 'whilst rendered 
incapable of work by some specific disease or by bodily or mental 
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disablement... commencing from the fourth day after being so rendered 
incapable of work, and continuing for a period not exceeding twenty-six 
weeks', and "disablement benefit" (at a lower rate) which then became 
payable 'so long as rendered incapable of work by the disease or dis-
ablement’ (National Insurance Act 1911). 
The foremost (socialist) social researchers of the time objected that 
this system would prove financially unsustainable. They argued that 
experience in Germany, and from the friendly societies showed that free 
choice of a doctor who would be the benefit gatekeeper would inevitably 
mean lax benefit control. 'Be the intention what it may, the Government 
will actually be "paying the people to be ill"! Hence the problem is, not only 
to prevent the multiplication of illnesses caused by flagrant neglect of 
hygienic precautions, and how, when illness does occur, to insist on the 
patient co-operating in his own cure, but also how to protect the funds 
against malingering in all its conscious and sub-conscious forms’ (Webb, 
Webb 1911). They summed the experience of the friendly societies as 
showing that: 
- Every organisation insuring against sickness or unemployment 
experienced steadily rising numbers of claims, although the health 
of their members was improving;  
- Cases of malingering were common, so that a whole new branch 
of medical practice had developed to deal with it;  
- Claims control was difficult, and medical certificates from the doc-
tors treating the claimants were often unhelpful, so that some so-
cieties required members to see their own salaried doctors (which 
was bitterly resented by members);  
- Claims levels were affected by the organisation of the business; 
societies who had local branches (where members knew each 
other and local contributions were locally allocated to local claims 
after a home visit), had lower claims levels than nationally organ-
ised funds. 
There is some evidence in the government papers that Lloyd George 
agreed with this criticism, but felt that the arrangements he had negotiated 
with the doctors and the friendly societies were, however imperfect, all that 
was practically and politically feasible (Lloyd George…1966, 364–5). 
In fact, the costs of Lloyd George's scheme so exceeded expecta-
tions that an investigation into them was organised seven months after its 
inception. This showed that the costs for men were as predicted, but those 
for women (who had not been previously covered by the friendly societies) 
were far greater. This partly reflected women who had previously contin-
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ued working despite disability because they had no other realistic choice 
of moving onto benefits, and partly a tendency for them not to return to 
work from sickness until they had completed household tasks left undone 
whilst they were ill. There were also weaknesses in medical certification, 
and the report recommended that the government should employ doctors 
to whom difficult cases could be referred for a second opinion (Report of 
the Departmental Committee… 1914). The First World War delayed 
implementation until 1920. The doctors of this 'Reference Service' 
gradually acquired wider duties of inspecting general practitioners and 
their practices, and became a powerful influence on the development of 
the specialty. 
 
Disability benefits 
The government nationalised sickness and disability benefit payments in 
1948. The basic structure was unchanged, but Disablement Benefit was 
increased to the level of Sickness Benefit, and became payable indefi-
nitely. Invalidity Benefit replaced Disablement Benefit in 1971. Although 
the basic rate was unchanged, supplementary payments to younger 
recipients made it more generous for many whose sickness persisted 
beyond six months. In addition it was both payable and tax free after 
retirement, up to age 70 for men and 65 for women. 
Sickness absence rates rose progressively. Occupational physicians 
noted what was happening, and investigated the reasons. In general, they 
found that social issues determined whether employees took time off 
which was attributed to sickness, rather than true health problems. At first, 
the government simply observed and analysed the trends. It then decided 
to try and persuade employers to do more to try and get their sick 
employees back to work. The responsibility of paying Sickness Benefit 
was transferred to employers who were required to pay “Statutory Sick 
Pay” (SSP). Initially, the cost of SSP was refunded by the government. 
Later re-imbursement was phased out, except for small employers facing 
unusually heavy costs. 
By 1994, the numbers on Invalidity Benefit had doubled, as had its 
cost. The government investigated the situation, with the following 
findings: 
1. The benefit gateway had loosened through case law. Since 1911, 
the basic entitlement to benefit had been that it was payable 'whilst 
rendered incapable of work by some specific disease or by bodily 
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or mental disablement’. Case law had recognised that this should 
mean being incapable of one’s own job for no longer than about six 
months. After that time, a looser test of any kind of work should be 
used. But, developing case law meant any kind of work had be-
come ‘work which he (or she) might reasonably be expected to do’, 
so introducing non-medical factors. Finally, further case law re-
quired that any kind of work had to be justified by quoting exam-
ples of the jobs the individual could be expected to do, so he or 
she could appeal against the decision. 
2.  Certificates from treating clinicians remained unreliable, particularly 
about the ability to do any type of work.  
3. Inflow to benefit had remained relatively constant; the increased 
numbers were due to reduced outflows; once on benefit, recipients 
tended to remain there.  
4.  Industrial re-structuring had lead to many low-skilled, middle aged 
men losing jobs based on physical work, and they had moved onto 
benefit. They had poor job prospects and social factors largely un-
derpinned their benefit entitlement. For exemple, 60 per cent of 
benefit recipients had musculo-skeletal problems and 40 per cent 
back pain, and many benefit recipients with back pain had no dis-
cernible disability; 
5.  There was no evidence that the health of the population was wors-
ening (Figure 1) to explain the increasing numbers on benefits for 
sickness and disability (and this continues to be the case); 
 
Figure 1. Proportion of People Reporting a Limiting Longstanding Illness. 
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The All-Work Test 
The response was to introduce a new Incapacity Benefit from 1995, 
replacing Invalidity Benefit. It has the following features. It applies from the 
beginning of the second six months of absence, when the ability to do any 
form of work becomes the formal test. Although information is obtained 
from treating clinicians, any medical statement or certificate they provide is 
no longer accepted as evidence of incapacity. A social security doctor 
applies a test instead. The test considers medical factors only, in the form 
of disabilities and abilities; non-medical social factors are not considered. 
The benefit is considerably less generous and no longer extends over the 
age of 65 years. 
A formal test “The All-Work Test” (AWT) replaced the opinion of the 
treating clinician. Designed with the help of a panel of 80 independent 
experts1, the requirements set out for the new test were that it should be 
medically based; clear and simple; fair, objective, and readily understand-
able; devised to reduce the role of GPs; and arranged to allow expert 
consideration of the medical factors and evidence. 
The resulting AWT defined 14 physical and sensory areas relevant 
to the issue of capacity to work (Table 1). Within each of these categories  
AWT defined a list of ‘descriptors’ giving an ascending scale of abil-
ity/disability. It assigned a numerical score to each descriptor within its 
category which related to similar scores in other categories (Table 2). 
 
Table 1. AWT: 14 physical/sensory functional areas. 
 
Five lower limb; rising from sitting, standing, walking, walking up  
stairs, bending and kneeling  
One trunk; sitting in a chair without arms 
Three upper limb; reaching, lifting and carrying, manual dexterity 
Three sensory; speech, hearing, vision 
Two ‘loss of control’; seizures, incontinence 
 
1 Consisting of people with disabilities; professionals expert in assessing disability; occupa-
tional physicians; general practitioners; representatives of organisations for people with dis-
abilities; and social security doctors. 
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Table 2. AWT: Example of scores. 
 
Rising from sitting 
 - cannot rise from sitting to standing (15 points) 
- cannot rise from sitting to standing without holding on to something  
 (7 points) 
- sometimes cannot rise from sitting to standing without holding on to  
 something (3 points) 
- no problems with rising from sitting (0 points)  
 
AWT defined four areas of mental health relevant to capacity for work; 
daily living, completion of tasks, coping with pressure, and interaction with 
other people. The test set a series of descriptions of mental health with 
yes/no answers and point scores for each answer reflecting the capacity 
for work. It provided a formula for summing the scores to give a final 
figure, and a scale to determine whether a score implied that it would not 
be reasonable to expect someone to seek work. Furthermore, AWT 
defined a series of conditions which implied that someone was so clearly 
incapacitated that the test should not be applied (“exemptions”) (for 
example, that they had a severe mental health problem requiring hospital 
care, were tetraplegic or registered blind). It also defined a list of situations 
where return to work was unreasonable (“non-functional descriptors”) (for 
example, that they were due to have a major operation or therapeutic 
procedure within the next 3 months). Finally, AWT defined the evidence 
required to decide that an exemption or non-functional descriptor applied. 
The new test was applied retrospectively to those who had moved onto 
Invalidity Benefit after its introduction was announced, and prospectively 
to new benefit claimants. 
The results of retrospective application of the test were relatively 
poor. Following re-examined recipients (not those over 58 years of age on 
13 April 1995 and who had been on benefit since 1 December 1993) 
showed that half claimed a new benefit within six months, most within 
three. Those unemployed before claiming Invalidity Benefit were more 
likely to claim a benefit. Also disallowed claimants were more likely to 
claim; 40 per cent had a live claim for IB at 12 months. 19 per cent got 
work immediately, rising to 23 per cent at 12 to 18 months. 
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The test was far more effective in reducing benefit inflow. Figure 2 
shows the effect on the numbers of benefit recipients. 
 
Figure 2. Working Age Claimants of Incapacity-Related Benefits (Excluding IB  
 Short-Term Lower Cases): 1979-2002. 
 
Numbers fell after introduction of the test, but then began to increase 
again, although at a far slower rate. This trend became apparent just as 
the UK elected a new Labour government in 1997. It faces an unprece-
dented and successful economic and labour market situation (Table 3). 
Therefore any major expansion of the workforce can only come from those 
currently on sickness and disability benefits, or from immigration.  
 
Table 3. The Labour Government: Economic and labour market situation. 
 
- ILO unemployment rate 1.46 million (5%); 
- Claimant unemployed 935,300; 
- About 1 million job vacancies; 
- 2.9 million on income replacement benefits for sickness and disability; 
1.2 million say they would like to work; 400,000 available for work within 
two weeks. 
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The government has therefore become extremely active in promot-
ing the return to work of those on sickness and disability benefits. Its main 
messages are: “Work is the best form of welfare for people of working 
age”, and “Work for those who can, security for those who cannot”. The 
fallowing measures are used: 
- Increase services to help those without work find a job, and widen 
conditionality. All benefit recipients of working age to have help to 
return to work from a personal adviser; 
- Strengthen Disability Discrimination Act; 
- Make work pay: National Minimum Wage, Employment Tax Credit 
(tops up low earnings). 
 
In parallel, there have been changes to the AWT. It has been subsumed 
into the Personal Capability Assessment (PCA). Whereas AWT concen-
trated on incapacity, PCA focuses on residual ability. It includes advice to 
the Personal Adviser on any previous work-related problems, personal 
and work-related capability, work restrictions\limitations, possible work-
place adaptation, and help and support back into some from of work.  
Other initiatives include the Job Retention and Rehabilitation Pilots.  
These are a randomised controlled trial, comparing the outcomes for four 
groups; health or workplace service boosts, or both, and a control group. 
Subjects are between 6 weeks and 6 months of going off sick. This is an 
attempt to reach subjects who are on SSP, still have an employer, and 
might be got back to work as opposed to moving onto benefit. The 
Incapacity Benefit Pilots will be a trial of healthcare boosts for those first 
claiming Incapacity Benefit (i.e. at six months after leaving work). They are 
coupled with mandatory work-focussed interviews with new specially 
trained advisers. 
 
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Department for Work and Pensions or the govern-
ment of the United Kingdom. 
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NEW DIRECTIONS IN DISABILITY 
(BENEFIT) POLICY: THE DUTCH 
EXPERIENCE 
Philip R. de Jong 
Introduction 
This paper reviews the Dutch disability benefit system and some other 
programmes that are part of a national policy towards persons with 
disabilities. It starts with a short description of the sickness and disability 
benefit programmes.1 Section 3 discusses trends in disability expenditures 
and beneficiaries in order to illustrate what is at issue. In Section 4 I give 
an overview of the changes that took place in the last ten years, their 
efficacy, and proposals that have recently been debated. The conclusion 
is that Holland is moving from a wayward system to a more balanced one 
using elements that the OECD suggests in its new publication on disability 
policy. 
 
The Dutch sickness and disability schemes 
Sick pay 
When a Dutch worker is unable to perform his or her job because of 
illness or injury, irrespective of its cause, he or she is entitled to sick pay. 
Sick pay replaces 70 per cent of gross wage earnings but most collective 
bargaining agreements between employers and employees stipulate that 
 
1 A broader description of the Dutch system of social welfare programmes can be found in 
Prinz, 2003. 
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sickness benefits are supplemented to the level of net earnings. Sick pay 
ends after 12 months.  
As of 1996, the employer is fully responsible for financing sick pay. 
He may reinsure his sick pay liability with a private insurer but is not 
obliged to do so. Employers are mandated to contract with a private 
provider of occupational health services to manage absenteeism. Doctors 
employed by these occupational health agencies check whether the 
absence from work is legitimate and give a prognosis concerning work 
resumption.  
Small firms may be unable to offer a commensurate job if an em-
ployee is afflicted by a disability that prevents him from doing his old job. 
In that case a reintegration service organisation should mediate towards 
placement in a new firm. As of 2003 employers are obliged to subscribe to 
the services of a private reintegration organisation to help disabled 
employees for whom no commensurate work is available within the firm.  
 
Disability  
Under the Dutch ruling any illness or injury entitles an insured person to a 
disability benefit after a mandatory waiting period of 12 months. While 
other OECD countries make a distinction between whether the impairment 
occurred on the job or elsewhere, only the consequence of impairment is 
relevant for the Dutch disability insurance programme.  
Three separate benefit programmes targeting different social groups 
provide compensation for loss of earning capacity due to long-term or 
permanent disablement. The first, and by far the biggest, programme 
covers employees, and awards wage-related benefits. The other two 
address the self-employed and those handicapped from youth. These 
provide flat-rate benefits at the social minimum level. Youth handicapped 
are entitled to a benefit from age 18 onwards. Otherwise, the design and 
administration of these two programmes are the same as for the wage-
related programme. 
The degree of disablement is assessed by consideration of the dis-
abled worker's residual earning capacity. Capacity is defined by the 
earnings flowing from any job commensurate with one's residual capabili-
ties as a per centage of earnings. The degree of disablement is the 
complement of the residual earning capacity and defines the benefit level. 
The Disability Insurance programme for employees has seven disability 
classes. The minimum loss of earning capacity entitling to a benefit is 
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fifteen per cent. Wage replacement rates range from 14 per cent of 
covered earnings in the 15 to 25 per cent disablement category to 70 per 
cent in the 80 to 100 per cent category.  
The other two disability schemes – for self-employed and youth 
handicapped – have six disability categories: they skip the first category 
so that entitlement starts at a degree of disability of 25 per cent. The wage 
base here is the minimum wage and so the benefit at full disablement is 
70 per cent of the minimum wage.2
Partial benefits can be combined with labor earnings up to the level 
of the pre-disability wage. If recipients of a partial benefit are unable to find 
gainful employment they are entitled to a partial unemployment benefit. 
Combination of disability and unemployment benefits never replaces more 
than 70 per cent of earnings lost.  
Wage-related benefits are based on age and earnings. The disability 
benefit period is cut in two, chronologically linked parts. The first is a short-
term wage-related benefit replacing 70 per cent of before-tax earnings. 
The duration of this wage-related benefit depends on the age at the onset 
of disablement. It varies from zero for those under age 33 to six years for 
those whose disability started at aged 58 or beyond. Hence, workers age 
58 and older keep their 70 per cent replacement rate until the statutory 
pension age of 65. For older workers the accrual of pension rights related 
to one’s last job continues after entering the disability rolls. In addition, 
most pension plans do not require disability beneficiaries to pay pension 
premiums. Such contract rules discourage re-entry into the labour market 
by creating a gap in pension accrual rights, and make the disability system 
an alternative early retirement option.3
The second part is a so-called follow-up benefit with a lower income 
base and, hence, a lower replacement rate with respect to the pre-
disability wage. During the follow-up period, the income base for benefit 
 
2 In 2003 the minimum wage equals €16,189.63 per year. 
3 Dutch early retirement programmes have no statutory basis; they emerged as an element of 
collective bargaining agreements between trade unions and employers in 1975. The tremen-
dous growth of early retirement plans since, the expected fiscal pressure of an ageing work-
force, and benefits being paid out of pay-as-you-go funds, called for changes in these actuari-
ally unbalanced programmes. An increasing number of these –collectively bargained – plans 
are now being transformed into capital funded flexible pension schemes with a much closer 
link between contributions and pension rights. These changes are likely to boost the interest in 
the disability benefit option. 
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calculation is the minimum wage plus a supplement depending on the age 
at onset according to the formula: 2.0 per cent  [age at onset – 15][wage 
– minimum wage]. Age serves as a proxy for work history, or “insurance 
years”, introducing a quasi-pension element into the disability system. 
Most collective bargaining agreements cover the gap between the lower 
replacement rates in the follow-up period and the 70 per cent replacement 
rate during the first period of disablement (including the ‘sickness year’). 
The effective replacement rate when fully disabled, therefore, stays at 70 
per cent in most cases. 
Disability benefits are capped by a maximum amount of covered 
earnings which equals about €43,000 per annum (in 2003). This is also 
the maximum amount of income taxable for disability (and unemployment) 
insurance.  
 
Trends and Issues 
In May 2002 the British weekly Economist commented on the Dutch 
economy in an opinion article titled “Going Dutch”. It wrote: “(...) it is the 
very need for consensus that has inhibited further reforms to the much-
abused and excessively generous disability system, which pays out to a 
ludicrous one in seven Dutch people of working age.” In the eyes of this 
commentator the Dutch disability experience is a clear illustration of the 
negative side of the much-praised culture of consensus and tolerance in 
Holland.  
 
What happened really? 
The data collected as part of the OECD disability policy project both 
confirms and refutes the stereotype of the Dutch disability system given by 
this quote. According to Table 2.1 of the OECD report Holland is still 
among the big spenders on disability benefits but it is not the biggest 
spending country anymore, as it was in 1990. In 1999 broad disability 
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benefit expenditures were 4.14 per cent of GDP, which is 28 per cent 
lower than in 1991.4
Figure 1 shows the trend in the number of persons receiving a dis-
ability benefit as a per centage of the labour force (including disability 
beneficiaries),5 and disability benefit expenditures as a per centage of 
GDP. Disability benefits are here defined in a narrow sense, including both 
benefits from contributory and non-contributory disability schemes. From a 
1985 top of 4.2 per cent of GDP disability benefit expenditures decreased 
to 2.6 per cent in 2001. 
 
Figure 1. DI-benefits as % of GDP and DI-beneficiaries as % of the labour force,  
 1974-2001. 
 
4 ‘Broad’ includes disability benefits, sick pay and work injury benefits. 
5 The labour force is measureds in full time equivalents (i.e., corrected for part-timers); disabil-
ity beneficiaries are measures in full benefit equivalents (i.e., corrected for partial benefits). 
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At the same time, however, the relative number of beneficiaries 
stayed at 11 per cent of the labour force – the level it had reached in 1981, 
after the disability explosion of the 1970s. In absolute terms, the number 
of disability beneficiaries grew continuously from 475,000 in 1976 to 
921,000 in 1993.6 Changes in the definition of disability and in the way 
benefits are calculated drastically reduced the number of new awards. 
Moreover, part of the current beneficiaries was reviewed using the new, 
more stringent definition. This increased the number of benefit termina-
tions and, on balance, led to a 7 per cent drop in the number of beneficiar-
ies, to 855,000 in 1996. From then on the numbers started growing again, 
and reached 979,000 in November 2002, coming close to the politically 
contentious level of one million disabled.  
 
Benefit cuts 
The Figure 1 above shows that the reduction in spending on disability 
benefits was not caused by a smaller number of beneficiaries. Logically, 
then, the average benefit must have gone down. First, over the 25 years 
covered by the Figure 1 cutting statutory benefits appeared to be the only 
policy measure to reduce the financial burden of an otherwise uncontrolla-
ble programme. In the early 1980s benefits lost 25 per cent of their 
purchasing power by a series of substantial retrenchments. First, levying 
social insurance contributions on benefit income changed the calculation 
of after tax benefit amounts. In 1982 and 1983, the after-tax DI-benefit 
level was reduced through the abolition of certain tax exemptions for the 
disabled. In 1984, the earnings base from which benefits were calculated 
was reduced. Moreover, all incomes under government control – transfers, 
civil servant salaries, and the statutory minimum wage – suffered a 3 per 
cent nominal cut. Finally, in 1985, (before tax) replacement rates were 
lowered from 80 to 70 per cent of the last earnings, when fully disabled. 
These direct cuts were accompanied by the elimination of the system of 
automatic indexation (adjustment) of government controlled incomes. 
 
6 In 1976 the disability scheme was broadened. From then on it also included those handi-
capped in youth and the self-employed. The absolute numbers quoted are not corrected for 
partial benefits. 
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Benefits were cut again in August 1993, when statutory replacement rates 
were reduced according to the age at the onset of disability. As a result, 
benefits lost another 20 per cent of their real value between 1985 and 
1995. This loss contrasts sharply with per capita GDP, which increased by 
one third during the same period. 
 
Partial benefits 
Second, after the changes of 1993 the share of partial benefits grew 
sharply. By these changes the notion of suitable work was eliminated from 
the definition of disability. Capacity is since defined by the earnings 
flowing from any job commensurate with one's residual capabilities as a 
per centage of pre-disability usual earnings. The degree of disablement is 
the complement of the residual earning capacity and defines the benefit 
level. Before 1994, only jobs that were compatible with one's training and 
work history could be taken into consideration in the assessment of 
residual capacity. This new ruling made the per centage of partials among 
new awards grow from 19 per cent in 1990 to 45 per cent in 2001.  
Two thirds of partial benefit awardees work. For them, and their em-
ployers, the benefit acts as a wage subsidy. Research has shown that 
partial beneficiaries differ from full beneficiaries in many respects: They 
are older, better educated, more often male, married and main breadwin-
ner, have a longer tenure with their current employer and work in finan-
cially healthy companies (de Jong, Thio 2002). In short, Dutch partial 
beneficiaries are socially and economically better off. The data suggest 
that partial benefits are often used to offer older employees easier work 
conditions and act as a partial early retirement scheme. 
 
The average beneficiary has changed 
Over the past three decades the typical new disability beneficiary changed 
from an older male industry worker with a long work record in physically 
strenuous work into a younger female employee in the service industry 
with a relatively short labour market record. As 57 per cent of Dutch 
women work part-time their wages and their disability benefits are lower 
(OECD 2002). An increasing proportion of women among disability 
entrants, therefore, implies lower benefits, other things equal.  
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Figure 2 displays the disability beneficiary incidence rate for men 
and women. Women had lower rates until 1985, and have higher ones 
ever since. More importantly, the gap between the two incidence rates 
increased continuously from 1983, when the female rate was 15 per cent 
lower than that of men, till 1998 when women had a 80 per cent higher 
risk of becoming dependent on disability benefits. It has stayed at that 
level since.  
In absolute terms the total number of disability beneficiaries in-
creased by six per cent between 1991 and 2001. While the male benefici-
ary volume decreased by 13 per cent, its female counterpart increased by 
43 per cent.  
 
Figure 2. New beneficiaries as % of the labour force by gender, 1971-2001. 
 
The sharp increase in female disability was matched by an equally strong 
growth of the labour force participation of mothers. Traditionally, Holland 
had very low labour force participation rates of married women. In the 
1970s three out of four women stopped working after the birth of the first 
child. Twenty years later only one third stops. In other words, the tradi-
tional single-earner model has been replaced by that where husbands 
work full-time and wives have part-time jobs. For lack of sufficient child 
care facilities this social change has been accommodated by the disability 
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scheme. Disability benefits allowed market production to be replaced by 
home production without a sharp drop in household income. The feminisa-
tion of disability benefit dependency illustrates how an income-oriented 
disability policy invites to put the strains of dual earnership in medical 
terms. 
 
New policies: privatisation and reintegra-
tion 
Enhanced incentives… 
In the early 1990s Dutch policymakers turned to defining the disability 
issue in terms of ‘moral hazard’. They concluded that the system lacked 
appropriate incentives for the three parties directly involved: employees, 
employers and system administrators.  
 
…for employees 
Employees were hit by benefit cuts in 1993, when the ‘two-phases’ system 
was introduced – a wage-replacement phase followed by a phase with a 
lower, age-dependent, replacement rate (see above). Although collective 
bargaining agreements correct the gap between the lower rate in the 
second phase and that in the first phase for most employees these 
supplements came in the place of supplements on the standard 70 per 
cent replacement rate up to 100 per cent of the net wage. All in all, the 
effective rate went down for most employees.  
As part of the 1993 amendments the definition of disability under the 
Disability Insurance Act became stricter. The loss of earning capacity used 
to be assessed against work that was considered suitable with respect to 
someone’s education and achieved level of functioning. If a disability 
would prevent employment in suitable work one was considered fully 
disabled. As of August 1993, the extent of disablement is assessed by 
considering the complete labour market, instead of the parts that are 
suitable. This is one of the reasons why the share of partial benefits 
increased sharply. Moreover, the disability status of all beneficiaries who 
were younger than 45 was reviewed according to the new standards. 
These reviews led to a surge in terminations and reductions of benefits.  
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The 1993 amendments also affected the incidence of new disability 
awards (see Figure 2). The decrease in awards may well be the combined 
result of increased stringency of the gatekeeper and lower application 
rates because disability benefits lost part of their financial appeal due to 
lower benefits and stricter eligibility requirements. But the benefit cuts, 
together with a booming economy and an increasingly tight labour market 
during the last six years, also changed the face of disability. Better paid 
workers with long careers tried to avoid becoming fully dependent on 
disability benefits as they had better opportunities in the labour market. 
Secondary breadwinners and low-wage workers would lose less when 
going on disability and are therefore strongly over-represented among the 
current disability entrants. 
A smaller number of awards and a steep increase of benefit termina-
tions resulted in a 7 per cent decrease of the disability beneficiary 
population over the three years between 1994-1996. So far these were the 
only years in which the number of beneficiaries declined since the 
introduction of the comprehensive disability insurance scheme in 1967. 
 
…and for employers 
Sickness benefits were privatised 
In March 1996, the Sickness Benefit Act was abolished. Under this Act 
sick pay was collectively financed through sector specific insurance funds. 
These funds were administrated by public agencies. By abolishing this Act 
employers became responsible for coverage of sick pay during the first 12 
months of illness, after which Disability Insurance takes over. Under the 
Civil Code, firms are obliged to continue payment of 70 per cent of 
earnings during illness. They may choose freely whether they want to bear 
their sick pay risk themselves or have (part of) it covered by a private 
insurer. 
This is a remarkable change. A fully regulated monopoly market to 
which private insurers had no access has been transformed into a 
deregulated one on which private insurers freely bid for contracts with 
firms that seek to insure their sick pay liabilities. Firms are legally man-
dated to contract with a private occupational health agency and buy a 
package of services including prevention and monitoring of sick spells. 
These new mandates seek to reduce absenteeism and inflow into the 
disability benefit programme by confronting firms with its full cost. Invest-
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ment in prevention and reduction of illness is profitable as it reduces 
avoidable costs of absenteeism. 
Sickness absence rates dropped from 8 per cent in 1990 to 6 per 
cent in 2000 – a 25 per cent drop (Veerman, Besseling 2001, 60). Both 
these years represent a cyclical top and a comparison between these, 
therefore, controls the influence of the business cycle on absenteeism. At 
least part of this large drop can be ascribed to privatisation, and its 
associated incentives. This favourable result is obtained despite the fact 
that about 80 per cent of all firms took out some from of private insurance 
to cover their sickness liabilities.  
There appears to be a strong negative relationship between firm size 
and insurance coverage: while firms with less than 20 employees have a 
coverage rate of about 83 per cent, only 25 per cent of those with 100 or 
more workers buy insurance. Larger firms also choose a larger coinsur-
ance period or buy a stop-loss arrangement (Veerman et al. 2001, 22-27). 
To avoid adverse selection insurance companies stipulate that no 
employee be excluded from coverage under a sick pay policy which the 
employer buys. Insurers also demand that firms contract occupational 
health agencies, and stipulate which set of services is to be contracted.  
A parliamentary majority expected that privatisation of sickness 
benefits would make the labour market less accessible for people with 
disabilities because employers would check the health status of job 
applicants more strictly. To counter that problem an act banning medical 
examinations as part of an application procedure was introduced. Survey 
data show that selection on the basis of health risks has not increased due 
to privatisation: in 1999 about one third of firms report that they scrutinise 
applicants sharply on health. The same share did so in around 1990. To 
what extent this result is due to the Act on Medical Examinations is 
unclear (de Vos et al. 2001). 
Surprisingly enough privatisation did not induce a surge in conflicts 
between sick workers and employers refusing to continue payment of their 
wages. This may also be the result of the fact that the privatisation was 
enacted in a boom period. The current recession may be used to test to 
what extent private financing of sickness benefits is weatherproof.  
 
Disability contribution rates are experience rated  
Since 1998 experience rating of firms is gradually phased into the 
disability insurance scheme. Pre-1998 benefits are still funded by the 
existing uniform pay-as-you-go contribution rates but as of 1998 the first 
five years of disability benefit recipiency of new beneficiaries is paid out of 
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premiums that are levied according to the “polluter pays principle.” If an 
employee is awarded a disability benefit, the firm will face a higher 
contribution rate, and vice versa if a firm employs a disability beneficiary. 
Moreover, firms are allowed to opt out of the public insurance system, but 
only with respect to the coverage of the first five years of benefit recipi-
ency.  
The disability insurance scheme for employees is now financed by 
levying two separate premium rates, both paid by the employer. The first 
is a uniform pay-as-you-go rate covering the benefits of those that were 
already on the rolls before 1998. Five years after its start –i.e., from 2003 
– the pay-as-you-go rate also covers benefits that started after 1997 and 
last more than five years. Over the past five years this rate has gone down 
from 7.55 per cent to 5.05 per cent of taxable wage (up to €43,000 per 
year).  
The second rate covers the first five years of benefit recipiency and 
is differentiated according to the firm-specific disability risk. To calculate 
the risk in year t the total expenditures on disability benefits of the firm’s 
disabled employees in year t-2 is taken and expressed as a per centage of 
the average wage-bill over the past five-year period. This firm-specific risk 
determines the differentiated rate. The average risk rate has increased 
from 0.30 per cent in 1998 to 2.38 per cent in 2003. As of 2003 only firms 
with a wage -bill of more than €600,000 pay differentiated rates. These 
rates are limited by a lower and an upper bound. The upper bound 
increased from 1.12 per cent in 1998 to 8.52 per cent in 2003.  
Five years after the inception of experience rating the system can be 
considered mature. The uniform pay-as-you-go rate is expected to stay at 
about the current level of 5 per cent of taxable wages. What the average 
risk rate will do strongly depends on how the inflow rates develop.  
At the end of 2001 only 0.9 per cent of Dutch firms had opted out of 
this public financing scheme and had chosen to self-insure the risk of 
paying the first five years of disability benefit payment (first six years if one 
includes the sickness benefit year). These firms account for 5.6 per cent of 
total wages because, naturally, ‘large’ employers (with a wage -bill larger 
than €600,000) are over-represented among the self-insured. In the public 
pay-as-you-go division of disability insurance only 12 per cent are large 
firms. Among the self-insured 25 per cent are large. 
Whether experience rating has reduced the inflow rates is yet un-
known. The phase-in stage of differentiated premiums has just ended, and 
the period since those rates are ‘biting’ is still short.  
 
61
….but not for the gatekeepers of the programme 
In the debate on disability policy the focus gradually shifted from the 
programme itself toward the programme administrators. In 1993, a multi-
party parliamentary committee investigated the operations of the then 
existing Insurance Agencies which were organised by sector of industry 
and held a legally protected monopoly with regard to the administration of 
sickness, disability and unemployment insurance benefits. The committee 
devoted special attention to the administration of the disability insurance 
scheme. The committee publicly interrogated a vast number of current and 
former administrators, civil servants, and politicians. The picture that 
emerged from the nightly televised summaries was devastating for the 
image of the Insurance Agencies. What most suspected, and what had 
already been shown by research, was now publicly confirmed. The 
committee’s report created broad political support for drastic changes 
regarding, in particular, the dominant, and autonomous, position of the 
trade unions and employers' representatives in the management of social 
insurance. 
In 1995, as a result of the committee’s recommendations, an inde-
pendent supervisory body was set up. It publishes annual reports on the 
efficiency and legality of the administration of the social insurance 
programs. In 1997, the public Insurance Agencies that were run by the 
social partners were privatised, and regrouped themselves into five 
organisations. Next to their traditional tasks in administering public 
(unemployment and disability) insurance programmes, they set up a range 
of private activities, offering medical and vocational rehabilitation, and 
occupational health and employment services.  
The original plan was to create a competitive market on which these 
five agencies, as well as new entrants to this market, would compete for 
contracts with companies or groups of companies to administer wage-
replacing unemployment and disability insurance. The trend was towards 
offering ‘full-service packages’ that would cover the legally mandated 
social insurance liabilities as well as pensions, health insurance and 
outplacement of redundant employees.  
The public debate on this model of private delivery of social insur-
ance disclosed several problems. A competitive insurance market for 
mandatory coverage of disability risks could be viable, and efficient, if 
private insurers would be allowed to control all the links in the “insurance 
chain”: running from drafting policies, calculating premiums, administering 
indemnities, controlling damages and managing claims. Insurers could 
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offer firms tailor-made packages by varying elements such as the extent of 
co-insurance and the intensity of damage control through prevention, swift 
rehabilitation and monitoring activities. One crucial element in this chain is 
the assessment of the degree of disablement. A political majority was 
unwilling to subject disability assessment to the business interest of 
private insurers. As a consequence, a hybrid model was proposed in 
which the whole chain was privatised except disability assessment, which 
was to be done by a separate public (medical) agency. 
Second, while disability is a privately insurable risk, unemployment 
is not. Privatisation of unemployment insurance would not obtain a 
(socially) efficient market. Apart from the insurmountable problem of risk 
dependency, employers would only be interested in the cheapest unem-
ployment insurance administration contract because they would not profit 
from investment in quick re-employment of workers after they became 
redundant. Putting disability and unemployment risks in one basket, 
therefore, would result in a (socially) sub-optimal outcome.  
Third, private agencies that cover mandatory (public) insurance are 
likely to offer additional, related, insurance services, such as health 
insurance, pensions. To the extent that the portability of such employee 
benefit packages is limited, employees are locked in to the firm. Likewise, 
firms may find it difficult to change providers of employee benefits. 
And, finally, private agencies that get data on covered workers be-
cause they run public schemes may abuse those for other commercial 
activities, e.g., risk selection for health insurance. Similarly, they may use 
money from mandatory, public, insurance for their private business. 
Auditing such hybrid organisations is complex, controversial, and expen-
sive. 
For these, and other, reasons a political majority pulled the plug on 
this privatisation plan in the summer of 1999. In 2002 the Social Insurance 
Institute was established to run the disability and unemployment insurance 
schemes as a so-called quango (quasi-autonomous non-governmental 
organisation) under contract with the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment. Only rehabilitation (reintegration into paid work) is con-
tracted out to private firms. This could offer an opportunity for the existing 
occupational health service companies that now do the management of 
sickness benefit claims to broaden their scope.  
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Reintegration 
REA-provisions 
In contrast to countries with a similarly broad social welfare system the 
Dutch disability programme used to lack effective mandates regarding 
vocational rehabilitation and a rehabilitation infrastructure to support such 
mandates. This was increasingly felt as a system failure. In July 1998 the 
Act on Reintegration of Work Handicapped Persons (REA) introduced a 
new target group. Under this Act the set of provisions in kind and subsi-
dies that previously were scattered over a number of schemes were 
added together and made consistent.  
 
Work handicapped persons are all those:  
- that have a disability that reduces their productive capacity, and  
- are entitled to a disability benefit, or those that have lost their enti-
tlement less than five years ago;  
- are entitled to provision in kind or subsidy to maintain or restore 
their productivity, or those that have lost their entitlement to such 
provision less than five years ago;  
- belong to the group targeted by the Sheltered Work Provision Act;  
- do not belong to any of the aforementioned groups but have been 
assessed (through medical examination at a social insurance 
agency) as being work handicapped. 
 
The status of work handicapped is allowed for five years, after which it has 
to be re-established. REA excludes all those work handicapped persons 
that have an employment contract, unless they have reached the limit of 
12 months of illness, with or without a disability insurance award, and 
those that have not reached this limit but are unable to resume with their 
current employer.  
In 2000 about 1.2 million persons (12 per cent of the working age 
(18-64) population) were counted as work handicapped. Of those 79 per 
cent are benefit recipients; 34 per cent of the work handicapped popula-
tion are employed. Work handicapped are older than the average 
employee: 61 per cent are older than 45 against 28 per cent of all 
employees.  
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As of 2002 REA covers the following types of provisions: 
1. Work handicapped employees may be entitled to education, train-
ing, mobility provisions, trial placement and personal assistance 
and certain therapies (like stress and RSI training) to maintain or 
restore their productivity  
2. Companies pay a lower disability insurance rate and are exempt 
from experience rating for handicapped workers. The sickness be-
nefits of handicapped workers are covered collectively so that their 
employers do not bear the financial risk of continued wage 
payment if they would fall ill. 
3. Companies are entitled to subsidies that cover the cost of accom-
modation of the work place. 
 
In 2001 57,000 REA-provisions were awarded to employees, and about 
50,000 to employers. As employees, or their employers, often get more 
than one provision the number of employees that get a provision is much 
less than the total number of provisions given in 2001 (107,000). But even 
if this sum would be the number of workers getting a REA-provision it is 
small compared with a target group of 800,000 non-working handicapped.  
Moreover, survey data on cohorts of those that reached the disability 
insurance waiting period of twelve months of illness in 2001 show that the 
instruments are used selectively in a sense that suggests a certain extent 
of dead-weight loss: REA helps those that are in a relatively favourable 
position more often than others. The group that gets a relatively large 
amount of support from REA is very similar to those that get partial 
disability benefits: they are better educated, they have longer tenure, they 
are more often breadwinners, and work for large, financially healthy, firms 
(Jehoel-Gijsbers, van Deursen 2003). The report on this survey concludes 
that the introduction of REA has not (yet?) led to a significant improvement 
of the reintegration process.  
 
Reintegration plans  
This conclusion is based on a study of workers who are long-term ill but 
still have an employment contract with their current employer. In that case, 
the employer and his occupational health agency make the application for 
a REA provision. Concerning disability beneficiaries REA provisions are 
usually part of a reintegration (back-to-work) plan drafted by vocational 
experts of the Social Insurance Institute. These plans may be compared 
with the `individual participation packages’ proposed by the OECD. On the 
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one hand beneficiaries can influence the design of the plan by stating their 
preferences for certain REA provisions and lines of work. On the other 
hand, beneficiaries are legally mandated to take all steps necessary to 
restore their productive capacities. Therefore, those that are offered a plan 
cannot refuse to co-operate, unless they can prove that they already are 
on the road back to work.  
The Social Insurance Institute contracts with private reintegration 
service organisations to execute reintegration plans. This is done by 
parcelling out groups (plots) of beneficiaries to organisations with the best 
offer in terms of price, successful placement record and professionalism. 
These plans are financed out of the REA -budget, and cover both the 
reintegration instruments and the effort of the reintegration service. In 
2001 about 50,000 reintegration plans were contracted for the work 
handicapped. About half of these concern disability beneficiaries; the 
others are unemployed disabled (with or without an unemployment 
transfer income). In other words, plans were made for about 2.5 per cent 
of the disability beneficiary population. According to contract 35 per cent 
(17,500 of 50,000 plans) should result in successful placements (employ-
ment for at least six months).  
 
Reintegration reports 
As of April 2002, the responsibilities of the sick employee, his/her em-
ployer, and the occupational health service are legally specified, and 
mandate a structured approach to early intervention in cases of illness. 
After a maximum of six weeks of absence the occupational (health 
service) doctor has to make a first assessment of medical cause, func-
tional limitations and give a prognosis regarding work resumption. On the 
basis of these data employer and employee together draft a vocational 
rehabilitation plan in which they specify an aim (resumption of cur-
rent/other job under current/accommodated conditions) and the steps 
needed to reach that aim. They appoint a case -manager, and fix dates at 
which the plan should be evaluated, and modified if necessary. The 
rehabilitation plan should be ready in the eighth week of illness. It is 
binding for both parties, and one party may summon the other when 
considered negligent.  
After 35 weeks of illness the Social Insurance Institute sends a Dis-
ability Insurance application form to the sick employee. Disability Insur-
ance claims have to be delivered before the 40th week of illness. Claims 
are only considered admissible if they are accompanied by a rehabilitation 
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report, containing the original rehabilitation plan, and an assessment as to 
why the plan has not (yet) resulted in work resumption. If the report is 
delayed, incomplete, or proves that the reintegration efforts were insuffi-
cient the claim is not processed and the employer is obliged to continue 
paying sickness benefits even after twelve months.  
This is a serious step in the direction of mutuality of rights and re-
sponsibilities both in the relationship between employer and employee, 
and of both parties in their relationship with the state, represented by the 
Social Insurance Institute. Employees who consistently refuse to co-
operate with their employer to execute the plan can be dismissed. To that 
end the labour law has been changed, because until now an absolute 
dismissal ban was in force for the first two years following the onset of 
disability.7 Employers can be sanctioned by a one-year extension of the 
payment period of sickness benefits if proven at fault. And employees may 
be penalised by cutting their disability insurance benefit. 
 
The Donner report 
In May 2001 a National Advisory Commission on Disability proposed to 
drastically revise the current scheme. After its chairman it is called the 
Donner Commission. The proposal takes the mutual responsibility of 
employer and employee to promote work resumption and prevent benefit 
dependency as a starting point. The employer is obliged to take care of 
the necessary accommodation of the current job, or to offer another job, 
inside or outside his firm. The employee has to provide the medical 
information necessary to adapt employment conditions, and has to accept 
any job offer earning at least 70 per cent of his previous wage.  
The sufficiency of the return to work efforts of employer and em-
ployee are to be judged by the Social Insurance Institute. Insufficiency will 
be sanctioned. If the employer is held liable he will have to continue 
payment of sickness benefit, until he has taken the steps judged neces-
sary by the Institute. If the employee proves unwilling to collaborate with 
 
7 A comparison among 10 European welfare states, the United States and Japan, shows that 
the Dutch system of job protection during sickness (still) is much stronger than in any of the 
twelve countries (Bakkum, Desczka 2002, 15-16. 
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reasonable plans and job offers the employer may dismiss him/her. The 
latter rules have already been effected by the introduction of the reintegra-
tion report in April 2002, except that the Donner commission proposed to 
make the waiting period before a benefit claim can be filed flexible with a 
minimum period of three months. 
This system of mutual obligations to promote swift work resumption 
is underscored by a new risk definition under Disability Insurance. People 
are only awarded a disability benefit if they can be considered perma-
nently and severely disabled. Partial disability is no longer covered by the 
public Disability Insurance programme. Expectations are that this alone 
will reduce the inflow rate by two thirds. Only if the inflow rate declines 
significantly the benefit under this new system can go back to its pre-1993 
level of 70 per cent of earnings.  
Disabled workers who, under this strict regime, are not eligible for 
disability benefit and who, despite reasonable efforts of their employer and 
themselves, are unable to find commensurate work can claim unemploy-
ment benefit.  
One of the main goals of this blueprint is to emphasise that workers 
who have fallen ill should do everything reasonable to go back to work as 
soon as possible. To that end they can appeal to broad support from their 
employers. Employers who remain negligent have to continue paying 
sickness benefit for an unlimited duration. This sanction should replace 
experience rating of the firm-specific disability risk. Those that are eligible 
for disability benefit are presumably left without any residual earning work 
ability, and are therefore not subject to rehabilitation mandates.  
 
The SER proposals 
The Donner proposals met with fierce opposition. Although the central 
recommendation to restrict the Disability Insurance programme to the 
permanently and fully disabled and to privatise partial disability was 
broadly accepted, the fact that many of those who are now entitled to 
disability benefit may become unemployed and end up on social assis-
tance was equally broadly considered unacceptable. Others noted that by 
doing away with experience rating, together with the possibility of eventu-
ally higher replacement rates, would bring the system back to its pre-1993 
state and would reinstate all the wrong incentives the system got rid of 
over the past years. A third form of criticism concerned the concept, 
definition and implementation of full and permanent disablement. The 
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gatekeepers of the programme would never be able to apply such a strict 
standard, especially under the pressure of disabled workers claiming a 
benefit, which would soon turn out to be higher than any other transfer 
income.  
The Donner proposals were send to the Social-Economic Council 
(SER) – the advisory body the Government has to consult in matters of 
social and labour market policy. This Council consists of trade unions’ and 
employers’ representatives and independent Crown Members. These 
three parties have equal shares in the Council.  
 
The SER accepted major parts of the Donner report but modified two 
crucial elements: 
1. Benefits were to compensate 75 per cent of lost earnings. The 
trade unions demanded this as a quid-pro-quo for the employers’ 
bonus: elimination of experience rating. 
2. Partial disability would be eliminated from Disability Insurance but 
a new system was proposed in which two classes of partial disabil-
ity would remain: those who are not fully disabled but suffer a loss 
of capacity of more than 35 per cent and those that have a limita-
tion which reduces capacity by less than 35 per cent.  
 
The first group would get a supplement on their wage if they were 
employed. Firms would be legally obliged to take out private insurance to 
cover these supplements. In case of unemployment they would be entitled 
to a benefit which eventually would go down to the level of the social 
minimum but which would remain (until age 65) an insurance entitlement 
without means tests. The second group (with a capacity loss of less than 
35 per cent) would be entitled to support from their employer to stay in 
employment. In case of unemployment they would be treated as regular 
unemployed who eventually end up on means tested welfare.  
The Government considered this mollification of the Donner propos-
als as undue. It argued that the mandatory private insurance system for 
those in the 35-100 disability class would work adversely. At least two of 
the three parties involved in this game (employers and private insurers) 
were expected to prefer unemployment over claiming a wage supplement 
– damages which could be avoided by making the employee redundant. 
But compared to a partial disability benefit under the current system the 
unemployment option was in many cases an improvement, too.  
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Government proposals 
The Government takes a stand close to the Donner proposals. Four new 
amendments are currently being prepared: 
1. A Bill is drafted in which the mandatory waiting period is extended 
from one to two years. This extends the sickness benefit payment 
period for employers but reduces the burden of experience rating 
correspondingly.  
2. The definition and operationalisation of the disability criterion pro-
posed by Donner is under serious study both by physicians and 
lawyers.  
3. An element, which is neither part of the Donner nor the SER pro-
posals, is the introduction of an employment record requirement 
before one is covered by Disability Insurance. The current coalition 
is in favour of the introduction of such an additional requirement.8
4. If one were to choose a Donner type criterion ILO treaty 121 rati-
fied by the Dutch government requires that those that would get 
partially disabled due to a work-related accident or occupational 
disease are covered by social insurance. Government has drafted 
a Bill to cover work-related risks by mandating employers to con-
tract private insurers. The need to do so would only be enhanced 
by the introduction of a contribution record requirement. 
 
All in all, ‘Donner’ would bring the Dutch disability benefit system in 
many respects back into the international mainstream. But in other 
respects it remains unique: it keeps its heavy employer mandates and 
reinforces elements of mutuality. 
 
8 An element, which makes the Dutch disability programme more accessible than those else-
where, is the absence of a required contribution period before a worker is fully covered. Such 
absence is natural under a Work Injury scheme, because a construction worker, who falls from 
a scaffold on the first day on the job, has to be covered. But general disability benefit pro-
grammes in other countries all require a certain contribution payment period, which may run 
up to 5 years, before full coverage is obtained  (Bakkum, Desczka 2002, 33-36).  
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WORK ABILITY AND 
FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY – THE 
FINNISH POINT OF VIEW 
Timo Aro 
Over the past ten years, working life has undergone a major change in 
Finland. First, the country experienced the deepest economic recession 
since the war years followed by a severe unemployment problem. The 
decade was also marked by a rapid process of internationalisation of large 
companies and record growth in the national product, which, however, did 
not bring about a decline in unemployment, as expected. Meanwhile, 
membership of the European Union and the common monetary union has 
significantly affected economic planning and operational options. Over the 
past three years, the share markets have continued to decline for the 
longest period in decades. 
A whole new sector, information technology, emerged in Finland and 
grew into international proportions. Working life has changed. Most 
workers use IT tools in their work, and there is a growing number of Finns 
who could be rightly considered knowledge workers. More and more 
people use symbols instead of only machines and equipment, they work 
together and for each other, creating information and knowledge-related 
services. Human capital has become a significant competitive advantage. 
Finnish society is being moulded by a change in its population struc-
ture, and a continuing high rate of unemployment. Our workforce is ageing 
rapidly and the move from working life to different types of early retirement 
pensions among the older age groups is common and takes place at an 
early age (Figure 1). An increasing number of contracts of employment 
are fragmented and often short-term. This has given cause for concern 
and caused psychological symptoms. Coping with pension expenditure 
and the health and medical care costs related to the change in the age 
structure of the population have become a key challenge for the Finnish 
economic and social policy. A twofold employment situation presents 
another challenge. Our unemployment has become structural and is at 
risk of remaining permanently high. There are almost 300,000 unem-
ployed jobseekers and their number seems to continue to grow due to the 
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weak economic development internationally. On the other hand, labour 
shortage will become more common in the next few years when the large 
post-war age groups retire. 
 
Source: Finnish Centre for Pensions. 
 
Figure 1. Proportion of 55-64-year-old pensioners and unemployed persons in  
 1981-2002. 
New stress factors in workplaces 
Finland is a country where the pace of work is hectic. Studies show that a 
good half of all workers feel that  the hectic pace is stressful and has an 
adverse effect on their work. Of the working-aged population, one in every 
five lives under the threat of layoff, notice or unemployment. Mental health 
problems now rank first as  the reason for retiring on a disability pension 
before musculoskeletal diseases (Figure 2). Improving the psychological 
atmosphere of workplaces, the work pace, and stress management will be 
important parts of personnel management in the future. Studies show that 
fair management practices reduce job-related stress symptoms and 
reduce the amount of sick leave. 
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Source: Finnish Centre for Pensions. 
 
Figure 2. Age-adjusted private-sector disability pensions (new awards) begin- 
 ning in 1990-2002, by important disease group. 
 
Traditionally, discussions about working life and occupational health have 
focused on factors that constitute a risk to health at work. Less attention 
has been paid to how being part of a working community can promote the 
worker’s health and well-being. Research findings show, however, that a 
wide-ranging workplace health promotion programme together with high-
quality occupational health and work protection schemes enhance health, 
work ability and business economics. 
 
Ageing population and availability of work-
force 
In the next few years, the ageing of the large post-war age groups, longer 
life expectancy, early retirement, and long-term unemployment will have 
an adverse effect on the dependency ratio. The weakening dependency  
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ratio is not only a Finnish phenomenon, but in Finland there are, however, 
certain additional factors related to the situation. The population is ageing 
faster in Finland than in many other western countries. On the other hand, 
it would seem that ageing entails a move out of the workforce more often 
in Finland than in other countries. The estimated retirement age is 59 
years, and people tend to move out of the workforce a year earlier. 
According to the Finnish Centre for Pensions, the retirement age has not 
risen significantly in the last few years. 
The size of the working-age population has continued to increase 
rapidly throughout the post-war period. From 1945 to 2009, the working-
age population will have grown by one million. In the present decade, the 
growth will be down to 5,000 a year and will centre on people aged over 
55. As of 2010, the size of the working-age population will decline and by 
2030, the number will have dropped to 400,000, i.e. a fall of 20,000 
persons a year on average. In addition, even before the decline in the size 
of the working-age population, there will be a drop in the availability of 
labour already this year (Figure 3). 
 
Source: Ministry of labour. 
 
Figure 3. Change in potential labour market supply 1990-2010. 
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The changes in the size of the working-age population are so significant 
and sudden that they will have a major effect on the labour market. 
Another problem connected with the ageing of the Finnish popula-
tion is education. The educational level of the post-war generation is low, 
and therefore, their potential for entering the labour market is relatively 
bleak. The situation looks bad for ageing workers for the next ten years at 
least, as the demands of work continue to increase. 
 
Health and work ability of working people  
The health of the working-age population has improved. Particularly, 
people in the age group 55-64 years feel that they are now in better 
health. Long-term morbidity has also declined in the age group 45-64 
years (Figure 4). The longer life expectancy of both men and women is 
also proof of this favourable trend. 
 
Source: Aromaa, Koskinen 2002. 
 
Figure 4. Age-adjusted prevalence of good or moderate health (employee´s  
 own concept) (%). 
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On the basis of the findings of the recently published study Health 2000, 
the majority of the working-age population considered themselves able to 
work (80%), and particularly the work ability of men had improved. On the 
other hand, only slightly over 50 per cent of the persons aged 55-64 
considered themselves able to work (Figure 5). If the favourable trend 
continues, more workers in the smaller age groups will be able to stay  in 
work longer as far as their health is concerned.  
 
Source: Aromaa, Koskinen 2002. 
 
Figure 5. Partly or totally disabled (own concept) among the 30-64-year-olds. 
 
The trend in health-promoting lifestyle factors has been favourable, with 
the exception of increasing alcohol consumption, a large number of 
smokers, and a growing problem of obesity (Figure 6). On the basis of 
research findings, it would appear that the lifestyle risk factors vis-à-vis 
sick leaves include drinking, smoking, obesity, and a lack of exercise, 
which means that much still remains to be done in public health promotion 
work in Finland (Table 1). 
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Source: Aromaa, Koskinen 2002. 
 
Figure 6. Prevalence of fatness (BMI >0  30), %. 
Table 1. Work community often to blame for absence from work due to illness. 
 
Risk factor      Men     Women 
 N=1490     N=4952 
 
Risk         Risk 
 Factors related to lifestyle  coefficient     coefficient 
 
Overweight  (BMI 25-30)      1.27        1.39 
 Fatness (BMI >30)      1.79        1.75 
 Official smoker      1.13        1.19 
 Excessive use of alcohol      1.47        1.02 
 Lack of physical activity      1.48        1.18 
 
Source: Kauppinen et al. 2000. 
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As regards chronic diseases, i.e. arteriosclerosis, the low-back syndrome, 
arthrosis, and particularly arthrosis affecting women’s knee joints have 
declined significantly, probably due to a decline in physically strenuous 
work. Increasing obesity may, however, in the future subject a growing 
number of working-age people to diseases affecting their joints. Asthma 
has also become increasingly common. Of the diseases of the respiratory 
organs, the incidence of chronic bronchitis has changed according to 
smoking habits so that it has declined among men and increased among 
women. 
Mental health problems, particularly mood disorders, burn out, and 
alcohol dependency are considered to be more common than before. In 
the light of research findings it would seem, however, that with the 
exception of alcohol dependency, mental health problems today are about 
as common as they were 20 years ago. Although psychological symptoms 
that weaken the mental well-being continue to be common (incidence 20-
25 per cent of the population), severe cases of depression are clearly 
more rare now (5 per cent of the population). The results show incontro-
vertibly, however, that mental health problems are a major public health 
risk, the prevention of which is one of the most important challenges for 
our health policy, and is the reason why workplace health promotion must 
be carried out effectively. Although disability pensions granted on the 
basis of mental health problems have become more commonplace in the 
1990s, recent studies give reason to assume that retirement related to 
mental disorders will no longer increase. An unfavourable increase may, 
however, continue as a result of insufficient resources in the health care 
sector. It may also be that the demands set for our general psychological 
fitness by information-intensive work will lead to a steady increase in 
pensions granted on the basis of mental health problems. Recent 
questionnaires show that job-related mental stress is a common cause for 
premature retirement. 
 
Assessment of work ability with respect to 
insurance medicine 
In the sphere of pension insurance legislation, attention given to work 
ability has usually focused on the absence of work ability or functional 
capacity, in other words: assessing disability for work or limitations on 
work ability. Such thinking is a consequence of the need to assess the 
79
examined person’s right   to financial benefits on the basis of various 
insurance policies. Although disability for work is defined in a number of 
different ways in legislation, the general, widely applied, principle in 
Finland complies with the Employees’ Pensions Act (TEL): “An employee 
whose work ability can be estimated to be continuously reduced by at 
least two fifths for a minimum of one year as a result of illness, deficiency, 
or disablement is eligible for a disability pension. In assessing reduction in 
work ability, the employee’s remaining capacity to earn income through 
work available to him/her and reasonably considered to suit him/her in 
view of his/her previous training, previous activity, age, living conditions, 
and other such issues are taken into account.” 
In the national pension scheme, the definition of disability for work is 
roughly in keeping with the Employees’ Pensions Act. In the national 
pension scheme, however, a pension is always granted to blind and 
physically handicapped people, and to people permanently so helpless 
that they cannot manage without another person’s help. 
Although pension legislation only defines the concept of disability for 
work, insurance practice has extensively applied concepts related to 
remaining work ability in recent years, and tried to promote ways of 
medical or vocational rehabilitation to improve the remaining work ability, 
and to modify work tasks so that they allow people to cope with their jobs 
in spite of reduced work ability due to illness. 
In the Finnish legislation, it is emphasised that disability for work 
means a medically assessed disability caused by illness, deficiency or 
disablement. In the sphere of pension insurance, the application of 
pension legislation and thus the definition of disability for work has been 
assigned to authorised pension providers. The solutions that the pension 
providers have arrived at are juridical decisions based on existing law and 
its established interpretations. When work ability is being assessed, both 
the attending physician and the insurance physician aim at a just, and 
often also unanimous, solution for the person in question. Divergent views 
concerning the disability of a person applying for compensation usually 
arise from the fact that the insurance company has the opportunity to 
assess work ability in the light of different kinds of information and often 
has more extensive information than the physician who examines and 
treats the person concerned, and writes a statement concerning this 
person. It may also happen that the information acquired by the attending 
physician on a patient is not made sufficiently available for assessment to 
the insurance physician. However, differences between a physician’s 
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assessment of work ability and the insurance company’s decision are 
unusual. 
 
Risk of work disability 
Employees at risk of disability may be entitled to vocational rehabilitation  
(Table 2). The pension legislation taking effect on 1 January 2004 allows 
increasingly close cooperation between the occupational health care, the  
 
Table 2. Vocational rehabilitation - Mission. 
 
Why do we have vocational rehabilitation? 
 
- to promote the general target of increasing the percentage of  
employed persons in the working-age population 
- to postpone the average retirement age in the long term and 
thereby relieve the pressure on future pension payments. 
 
Social Insurance Institution and the authorised pension provider in a 
situation where the occupational health care has discovered that illness is 
threatening the employee’s work ability. Hence, ageing employees in 
particular would have better opportunities to continue working longer than 
now, and rehabilitation could support those whose opportunities to 
continue working have been materially reduced by deteriorating health. 
This sets major requirements for assessing the threat of disability accu-
rately in occupational health care. 
In assessing the risk of disability, the occupational health care 
should analyse the employee’s functional capacity and its expected trend 
in the near future (Figure 7). Employees will be entitled to appropriate 
occupational rehabilitation if the criteria listed in Table 3 are met. Sickness 
means a diagnosed illness for which the potential for treatment and 
medical rehabilitation have been taken into account. The near future 
means an approximate period of five years. Work ability is at risk in a 
situation where, at the time of assessment, the employee’s disability due 
to illness would make him/her eligible for a disability pension in the near 
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future unless rehabilitation is undertaken. The likelihood of such disability 
is assessed with a scale applied in occupational disease diagnostics (very 
likely, likely, possible, unlikely and very unlikely). 
 
Figure 7. Risk of work disability. 
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Table 3. Risk of work disability. 
 
- Employees are entitled to obtain appropriate vocational rehabilita-
tion to prevent work disability or to improve their working and  
earning capacity, if 
 
- they have confirmed desease, defect or handicap that will likely 
place them at risk of disability in the near future. 
o A confirmed desease, defect or handicap means a disease 
diagnosed by a physician and registered by him or her in 
accordance whith the ICD disease classification system. 
 
- The likelihood of work disability is assessed using the scale for 
diagnosing occupational diseases: 1. highly likely, 2. likely, 3. pos-
sible, 4. unlikely, and 5. highly unlikely.  
 
- Work disability (the risk) refers to a situation where the employee 
would be granted full or partial disability pension. 
 
- The near future refers to a period of approximately five years. 
 
- Assessment of whether rehabilitation is reasonable takes the fol-
lowing considerations into account: 
o The employees’ age, occupation, previous work, education 
and work experience. 
o Whether the rehabilitation applied for is likely to enable the 
applicants to continue in or return to work suited to their 
health. 
 
- Reasonable assessment also includes the consideration of 
whether rehabilitation is likely to bring savings in pension expendi-
ture. 
 
If the aim is that the applicant is able to continue in his /her previous job, 
the objective is to improve his/her functional capacity by medical care or 
medical rehabilitation. If the aim is to modify the requirements of the 
previous job and thus improve the applicant’s work ability, the key issue is 
vocational rehabilitation. Then assessment must be made as to what 
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possibilities there are for the employee to transfer to a job that corre-
sponds more closely to his/her functional capacity by improving the 
employee’s current professional skill and expertise (Figure 8). It is 
important that the occupational health care in cooperation with the 
employee make a realistic plan including specific targets, which both the 
employee and the occupational health expert understand in the same way 
and to which both can commit themselves unequivocally. 
 
Figure 8. Assessment of risk of work disability. 
 
If the balance in work ability is disturbed by changes related to the 
organisation of the work, social working conditions, workplace values, the 
supervisors’ management and operating methods or lack of expertise and 
professional skill as well as the various subjective symptoms that the 
employee suffers from, responsibility for activities to promote work ability 
is taken on by the personnel administration, the supervisors and the 
occupational health care. If this balance is disturbed by an illness, 
deficiency or disablement appropriately diagnosed and treated by the 
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occupational health care or the public health services, action can be taken 
in cooperation with the Social Insurance Institution and the authorised 
pension provider. 
 
Summary 
In the next few years, the key challenges for Finland’s economic and 
social policy will be the growing pension and care service expenses 
caused by its ageing population. The still increasing unemployment figures 
combined with an impending scarcity of labour and the relatively early 
average retirement age are other issues that need to be addressed. 
Disability for work continues to be the most common reason for retir-
ing in Finland, followed by unemployment. The old-age pension is only the 
third most common reason for retirement. As the steadily improving public 
health does not seem to be reflected in people’s willingness to stay longer 
in work, our welfare state is now making every effort to focus on the 
development of working life and the promotion of work ability. 
Maintaining the core of our welfare state requires a significant rise in 
the employment rate of our working-age population. A key tool for 
achieving this goal is to defer retirement by 2-3 years. This will require 
further development of both workplace health promotion efforts and  the 
earnings-related pension  scheme. 
Working life should be developed to make staying in work a genuine 
alternative to retirement. In information society workplaces, the staff is a 
key competitive factor, the efficiency, expertise and well-being of which 
must be developed in a balanced manner. If a company focuses on 
efficiency only, it will result in growing dissatisfaction among customers, 
and in ill feeling, burn out and a wish to retire among staff. Lacking a 
continued focus on research, education and expertise presents a risk of 
expertise and jobs leaving the country. If we abandon the targets we have 
set for staff well-being, we will face work-related illnesses and other 
problems in the staff’s health and work ability. 
The private-sector pension reform that will take effect in 2005 will 
create the preconditions for competitiveness and productivity in Finnish 
working life. The reform will provide a flexible retirement age and pension 
accrual that will encourage people to stay in work. The retirement age will 
vary from 62 to 68 years, and the 60 per cent ceiling on pensions will be 
abolished. Preparations will be made to provide for a longer lifetime and 
growing pension contributions through increased funding and higher 
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worker contributions from the age of 53 onwards. The new system will 
gradually adjust the amount of pensions to today’s longer lifespan.  
Vocational rehabilitation within the earnings-related pension scheme 
will be revised as of the beginning of 2004 when it will become a compa-
rable benefit to the old disability pension. The reform seeks to promote 
work ability and prolong working careers. The estimate given in the 
pension reform was that the effective retirement age could be raised by 
two years by 2015 and by three years by 2050 . 
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SICKNESS COMPENSATION AND 
ACTIVITY COMPENSATION – THE 
REFORMED DISABILITY 
PENSION SYSTEM 
Catarina Svärd 
As from January 1st  this year a new social security benefit has come into 
force, namely the sickness and activity compensation. This benefit has 
replaced the former invalidity or disability pension.  
The terms disability pension and temporary disability pension are 
replaced by activity compensation for people aged 19–29 and sickness 
compensation or time-limited compensation for those aged 30–64.  
These benefits (activity compensation and sickness compensation) 
are a part of the sickness insurance system. 
Thus invalidity or disability pension is from now on no longer a part 
of the pension system, meaning that sickness and activity compensation is 
considered to be a part of the sickness insurance system.  
The changes are a result of reforms in the old-age pension system 
and the abolishing of the national basic pension and supplementary 
pension system (ATP). The tax regulations relating to a specific basic 
income tax deduction for pensioners (SGA) have also been abolished. 
Under the new system, the benefits are taxed in the same way as other 
income. As a result, the gross amount of these benefits has increased to 
compensate the individual, but as a rule, the net amount has remained the 
same. 
The new system does not involve any changes to the basic grounds 
for entitlement to compensation. As before, compensation may be granted 
to persons whose work ability is reduced for medical reasons, either 
permanently or for a long period (at least one year), by at least one 
quarter. Compensation is still payable at 100 per cent, 75 per cent, 50 per 
cent or 25 per cent of the full rate (or one quarter, half, three quarters and 
full compensation).  
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Sickness compensation and activity  
compensation 
The new rules apply to sickness compensation and activity compensation 
granted from 1 January 2003. Certain transitional provisions apply. 
The new allowances consist of both protection according to the loss 
of income principle in the form of income-related sickness compensation 
or activity compensation, and basic protection in the form of guaranteed 
compensation.  
In other words, the sickness and the activity compensation are di-
vided into two parts, one income-related and one residence-based. The 
income-related part is meant to be a compensation for the loss of income 
and the residence-based part is a basic benefit intended for those who 
have little or no income-related benefit. The Swedish government finances 
the residence-based compensation and the income-related compensation 
is financed by employers.  
 
- Sickness compensation is granted to insured persons between the 
ages of 30 and 64  
- Activity compensation is granted to insured persons between the 
ages of 19 and 29 
 
Sickness compensation can either be granted for an indefinite period or a 
limited period. Activity compensation is always paid for a limited period of 
a maximum of three years at a time.  
 
Insurance requirements for entitlement to 
sickness and activity compensation 
According to the Social Insurance Act, the right to social insurance 
allowance is dependent on whether you are resident or gainfully employed 
in Sweden. Social insurance comprises residence-based insurance 
relating to guaranteed amount and allowance, and work-based insurance 
relating to loss of income. If you work in Sweden, you are covered by 
work-based insurance, regardless of where you live. If you are resident in 
Sweden, you are insured for residence-based benefits. You are consid-
ered resident here if you have your permanent domicile in Sweden. If you 
are resident in Sweden but leave the country you will still be considered 
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resident here if your stay abroad is estimated to last no longer than one 
year. 
 
Income-related sickness compensation and 
activity compensation 
Income-related compensation is based on the qualifying income, which is 
the average of the three highest annual incomes earned during a given 
period prior to the date on which the risk materialised (framework period). 
The length of the framework period depends on the age of the insured at 
the time of materialisation of the risk. The framework period varies 
between 5 and 8 years.  
The framework period for insured aged 53 or above at the time of 
materialisation of the risk is 5 years. For insured aged 50, 51 or 52, the 
framework period is 6 years, for those aged 47, 48 or 49 it is 7 years and 
for insured aged 46 or less it is 8 years. 
The right to receive income-related compensation requires that the 
person is insured in Sweden for work-based benefits at the time of the 
materialisation of the risk and that is when the capacity for work is reduced 
by at least 25 per cent and the reduction is assessed to last for at least 
one year.  
The right to receive anything from income-related insurance also re-
quires a minimum of one year with income within the framework period. 
The size of the compensation is, in other words, not related to how 
long a person has been insured in Sweden. Neither is it possible to 
include as a basis for calculation income earned before the onset of the 
framework period. 
In certain cases, special rules apply to the calculation of income-
related activity compensation. 
Concerning persons aged 19–29 years there are two alternative 
ways of calculating the compensation. These two alternative ways are 
there for this group or these persons to have a fair chance of having a 
decent income when depending on the activity compensation. 
If it is more advantageous for the beneficiary, the qualifying income 
for income-related activity compensation may be calculated using the 
average of the two highest gross annual incomes during a framework  
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period of three years, instead of the principal rule. For persons aged 19–
29, the number of years of income from work are often few, and a 
framework period of three years may therefore be more advantageous. 
The income-related compensation is paid at 64 per cent of the indi-
vidual’s qualifying income up to 7.5 times the price base amount. 
The 7.5 price base amounts is the ceiling for sickness insurance 
benefits. The price base amount for 2003 is SEK38,600. In other words 
the person’s qualifying income can not be higher than SEK289,500 (7.5 x 
38,600). In 2003, the maximum income-related compensation is 
SEK185,280 a year (0.64 x 289,000). 
The income-related sickness and activity compensation is co-
ordinated with foreign benefits which correspond to sickness and activity 
compensation.  
The paid income-related compensation gives old-age pension rights. 
Income-related compensation can be paid out no matter where in 
the world the beneficiary decides to live. 
 
Guaranteed compensation and guaranteed 
level 
This compensation is dependent on insurance periods, in this case 
periods of residence.    
The right to guaranteed compensation and the size of the compen-
sation depend on how many insured years in Sweden the person can 
claim. At least three insured years are needed to qualify for compensation 
and the compensation will be proportionally reduced for anyone with an 
insurance period of less than 40 years. Like the right to receive income-
related compensation requires that the person is insured in Sweden for 
residence-based benefits at the time of the materialisation of the risk 
Since this residence-based compensation is meant to be granted to 
those who have little or no income-related compensation it will only be 
paid in certain cases. 
Guaranteed compensation is payable to those without or with a low 
income-related compensation, either in full, or as a top-up to reach the 
minimum guaranteed level. Thus this residence-based compensation is 
integrated with the person’s income-related compensation as well as with 
foreign invalidity benefits. 
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This guaranteed level is the same for married and unmarried indi-
viduals. The guaranteed level is age-related and amounts to 2.10 price 
base amounts for those under the age of 21, increasing successively 
every other year to 2.35 price base amounts by 29 years of age and 2.40 
price base amounts for those aged 30 or older. The price base amount for 
2003 is SEK38,600. 
In 2003, the maximum guaranteed compensation is SEK92,640 
(2.40 x 38,600). 
Guaranteed compensation is payable to individuals residing in Swe-
den, but also to those living in the EU/EEA area or in a country with which 
Sweden has reached a special agreement. 
 
Indexed sickness and activity compensa-
tion 
The allowances offer a standard protection as they will be recalculated 
annually in relation to changes in the price base amount. The benefits are 
adjusted upwards using the price base amount. The price base amount for 
2003 is SEK38,600. Several other social insurance benefits are linked to 
the price base amount. This means that the benefits maintain their value 
as general price levels change  
The beneficiary can also obtain a housing supplement for pension-
ers when he receives sickness or activity compensation. 
 
The conversion from disability pension  
system to income-related sickness com-
pensation and guaranteed compensation 
The transition took place like this. Everybody who during December 2002 
was receiving a disability pension and who should have this right if there 
were no new legislation in January 2003 had their pension transformed 
into sickness compensation. Parenthetical information is that in December 
2002 there were almost 489,000 persons with permanent or temporary 
disability pensions.  
For persons already receiving a disability pension when the new 
system entered into force on 1 January 2003, these benefits were 
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converted into income-related sickness compensation and guaranteed 
compensation. Persons below the age of 30 received sickness compensa-
tion instead of a disability pension.  
On the whole, the benefits were raised but they also became subject 
to higher tax. An adjustment amount ensured that the net compensation 
(compensation after tax) remained more or less the same after the 
changes had been introduced. Calculations were based on the last month 
of compensation according to the regulations in December 2002. The 
calculated amount was after that frozen. Later changes such as a person’s 
civil status can not affect the size of the compensation. Certain transitional 
provisions apply. 
 
Special rules for activity compensation 
Activity compensation can be granted for at the most three years at a time. 
After which an assessment of the person’s continued right to compensa-
tion is made. 
There are special rules for activity compensation. The age group 
19–29 can be receiving activity compensation at the most three years at a 
time and at the same levels as I mentioned earlier.  
A person in this age group with a disability also has a right to full ac-
tivity compensation without any special assessment of his capacity for 
work if the person in question has not been able to complete his compul-
sory or secondary school education by the turn of the mid-year during 
which he turns 19 and this is due to the disability. This means that there 
has to be a direct connection between the disability and the unfinished 
studies. 
The reason why the compensation to persons under 30 is called ac-
tivity compensation is among other things that this age group shall be 
offered to participate in activities. What is meant by an activity? According 
to the legislator an activity is an activity which can be supposed to have a 
positive effect on the insured person’s work ability. The final aim is that 
these activities should make the persons mentally ready to enter the 
labour market, but in the beginning the activity could be merely a support 
for the persons to adapt to or learn to cope with their illness or disability.  
Thus unlike the disability pension system, activity compensation 
should stimulate activity without jeopardising the individual’s economic 
security.  
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Social insurance offices should examine whether individuals who 
have been granted activity compensation can take part in activities that 
could have a positive effect on their state of health or physical or mental 
capacity for work. This serves to increase an individual’s prospects of 
taking part in working life. In consultation with the insured individual, the 
social insurance office should plan and coordinate the various activities 
that the individual has chosen so as to make the best use of his develop-
ment potential. Costs arising from participating in these activities may be 
reimbursed. It could be costs due to journeys, literature, participation fees 
etc. 
Since this is a brand new compensation or benefit the Swedish so-
cial security has little experience whatsoever how these matters are dealt 
with regionally or locally throughout Sweden. 
 
Dormant compensation 
The beneficiary can test his capacity for work 
The National Insurance Act makes it possible to leave the sickness 
compensation dormant during one year to start with.  
Persons who have been granted sickness compensation for at least 
one year should be entitled to test their capacity for work for one year 
without losing their compensation rights.  
This requires that the insured person has received the benefit for a 
minimum of one year. After that he may try to work and during this 
dormant time he may without any administrative complications receive the 
compensation if he didn’t succeed in working. 
The intention is that the insured will have the opportunity to try and 
work without the risk of the right to compensation to cease during this 
time. Thus the right to the compensation remains and very little adminis-
trative procedure is required to have the compensation paid out again. 
During this time of dormant compensation it is not necessary to make a 
new consideration as to the right to receive the compensation. An 
interesting thing is that during the first three months you are allowed to 
receive both your sickness or activity compensation and your salary. 
The period of one year may be prolonged another two years. But af-
ter the last period of two years it is necessary for the social insurance 
offices to make a new consideration as to the right to receive the 
compensation.  
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There are special rules for activity compensation. Persons aged 19-
29 who have been granted activity compensation are entitled to test their 
capacity for work for the entire remaining period for which the benefit has 
been granted, as from one year from the decision, without losing their right 
to compensation, in other words the maximum period is two years. 
In December 2002 there were 2,328 persons having their compen-
sations dormant. Something like 30 per cent quit having dormant compen-
sation after a certain time, which means that they get the compensation 
back after having tried to work. 
In order to further encourage people on sickness compensation to 
test their capacity to work, the period the benefit is dormant without the 
holder losing entitlement to it has been extended from one to at the most 
two years. The new rules were introduced in July this year. 
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CLOSING WORDS 
Jukka Kivekäs 
 
At the time when Finland joined the European Union in 1995, some 
sceptics reported fears that joining would mean crude harmonising of the 
Finnish legislation on social security and pensions with other EU countries 
by obligatory directives. The past ten years have shown that this has not 
been the case. Instead, there has been rapidly increased interest to know 
and understand the legislation, the practice as well as the processes 
applied in different countries.  
The need for knowledge is especially high when there are amend-
ments under way in one’s own country, which is the case in the Finnish 
pension scheme at present. Thus, the Seminar on Current Trends of 
Disability Pensions in Europe is very well timed, and the presentations at 
the seminar have made us more acquainted with some reforms in Europe 
and perhaps also with the purpose and meaning of the reforms. 
In many European countries, there are quite a lot of amendments 
under way or being planned right now. The problems pressuring countries 
to carry out pension reforms are very similar. Among the politicians and 
also among the economists, there is a shared worry about the increased 
number of persons retiring early, which evidently means increased 
pension costs when the large baby-boom cohorts born after the Second 
World War reach the typical age for early retirement. For example, in 
Finland the purpose of postponing the average retirement age has been 
mentioned in the policy of our last three Governments.  
Also, changes in the labour market make the amendments neces-
sary. Most of the pension schemes are built on the idea of a single long-
term employment, which nowadays is no longer the prevalent situation. 
Instead, there is a great shift towards atypical work with different kinds of 
problems concerning the pension scheme. There are also many predic-
tions according to which the lack of skilled workers, which is small at 
present, will become even greater in many European countries, and the 
question how the skilled workers currently in employment can be kept in 
work a few years longer has been raised. 
The reforms seem to have some common features. First of all, the 
aim to postpone the retirement age seems to be the most important one. 
There is also a clear trend to move the focus of the system, at least 
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somewhat, from a passive benefit programme to a flexible labour market 
programme. This means to change the idea of disability benefits to more 
integrative, active parts of the social policy. Also, the relationships of the 
pension organisations and the reintegrative professionals, for example, 
the occupational health care, rehabilitation service providers, and the 
employment offices have become much more active and co-operative. 
This is especially true if the reintegration policy includes some kind of 
early interventions, which also seem to be common features in many 
reforms. So far, the pension organisations have been rather passive and 
only paid for the consequences of the various situations in which the work 
ability of the worker has declined.  
An interesting feature is also the trend of outsourcing the reintegra-
tion services to private companies. Some of them may be social enter-
prises, whereas others are operating on clearly commercial principles. 
In many countries, there are specific activity programmes for certain 
groups under threat of marginalisation. For example, the long-term 
unemployed, or young people with handicaps or major social problems 
hindering them to integrate into the open market may have the right to 
certain benefits, which in many cases, however, may include some kind of 
responsibility to work or take part in some activation programme, as well. 
The policy makers have been very creative in building up the princi-
ples for encouraging such integration processes. Of course, there are 
many cultural and societal factors that explain the wide variation in the 
methods. Basically, the methods encourage people to stay on in working 
life (economic incentives to the employee or the employer), help employ-
ees and employers with reintegration (reintegration services), or make it 
more difficult to receive a disability pension (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Possible ways to encourage reintegration. 
 
Employee 
- Greater benefits during periods of active  rehabilitation 
- Decreasing benefits for periods of long-term disability 
 
Employer 
- Economic incentives 
- Obligations of reintegration and prevention 
 
Reintegration services 
 
Disability legislation 
- Definition of disability 
- Procedure of assessment 
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In most countries, disability assessment is of special importance and 
comes under public criticism. Applying medical facts to the legal frame-
works of benefit legislation is certainly not easy and involves a lot of 
discretion. The use and the role of specialised medical professionals, the 
insurance physicians, seem to vary from country to country. The criticism 
does not focus that much on the definition of disability, but instead on the 
procedure of assessment. The facts Mr Prinz told us about the OECD 
study, that most of the disabled people do not receive disability benefits 
and that 35 per cent of the benefit recipients do not regard themselves as 
disabled, are interesting. Does this explain that there is drastic failure in 
the assessment procedure? Or, is it just a fact we have to accept as the 
best we can do? 
Current trends in social policy and civil rights also make some de-
mands on the disability assessment procedure. The legal demands are 
legitimacy and justice so that the procedure would be and be perceived as 
fair, and treat all the applicants in the same way. The assessment 
procedure should also be accurate so that those who are entitled to 
benefits can be distinguished from those who are not. The rapid changes 
in legislation give rise also to demands on flexibility and effectiveness. 
Perhaps the most difficult demand to satisfy is having more transparency 
in the procedure. So far, the assessment procedure has been rather 
closed, and making it more transparent and easier to understand also for 
the applicant seems to be a difficult question for pension officers both to 
accept and organise. 
The shift in the diagnoses behind disability pensions has put de-
mands on making better tools for disability assessment, especially 
concerning mental diseases. In many countries, there is a trend to 
produce some standardised procedures or tools for disability assessment, 
and in that case the use of the functional capacity based on the ILO 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health is a very 
interesting one. 
To put the message of the whole seminar in a nutshell, one could 
say that there is a tendency to change the focus of pension organisations’ 
disability policy from passive benefit programmes to more active labour 
market programmes, and thus, a whole new sector, Disability Manage-
ment, can be seen as a business strategy of early intervention and 
reintegration for employees, employers, insurance companies as well as 
for the whole society. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Raija Gould and Sini Laitinen-Kuikka 
 
In this report, current trends of disability pensions have been examined 
from both a broad comparative perspective and from the perspective of 
some single countries. The country descriptions again had different 
interests, from historic to economic-policy and administrative. Disability 
pensions forming a growing national economic burden was the central 
motive behind all these examinations.  
In his opening remarks, Hannu Uusitalo described the increase of 
expenditures on disability pensions in different EU countries. Disability 
pensions form part of a larger problem: early withdrawal from the labour 
market and the economic burden of early and long retirement. This 
problem is not only in the interest of national governments but also of the 
EU as a community. In the single market, imbalances in the public 
finances of one member country are seen as a threat also to other 
member countries. This is the main reason why the EU has paid so much 
attention to the reform of the pension systems in the past few years. 
The targets of the common pension policy of the EU are not only fi-
nancial, however. A new balance between economic, employment and 
social policies has been striven for since the Lisbon Summit in spring 
2000. In ten years the EU should become not only the most competitive 
area in the world but also an area with better jobs and better social 
cohesion. The role of the social security systems in this aim is to support a 
change from a passive to a more active social policy. The principles of an 
active social policy are described in the articles of this report.  
In his article, Peter Wright brought up the dilemma of an active so-
cial policy from a historical perspective. Discussion on the mutual obliga-
tions of the individual and the society (here the social security system) 
easily leads the thoughts to the 18th century thought of deserving and 
undeserving poor. This dichotomy again is based on the idea of human 
beings mainly as independent and rational players. When examining 
disability this dilemma is aggravated. 
The OECD report reviewed here by Christopher Prinz brings up the 
dilemma of an active social policy very concretely. It describes the twin but 
potentially contradictory goals of disability policies: integration into 
employment and compensation for the loss of earnings capacity. The 
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economic tension between these two goals becomes even more promi-
nent by the target of the financial sustainability of the pension system. By 
recommending, for instance, to emphasize activation, mutual obligations 
and removal of disincentives to work, the conclusions of the OECD report 
place the ideology of disability policy close to the philosophy of unem-
ployment programmes. Passive compensation is insufficient; benefits 
should instead be interweaved in individually designed participation 
packages. 
The new approach of disability policies presented in the OECD re-
port is based on the idea of encouraging participation in economic and 
social life. By preferring in-work benefits to passive compensation and by 
setting new obligations for people with decreased work ability, the new 
policy approach suggests active participation as a precondition for benefit 
receipt.  
The new proposals to reform the Dutch disability benefit system fol-
low the same line of thought. As Philip de Jong points out, under the new 
system disability benefits would be awarded only to people who have no 
residual work ability. Those with decreased work ability, who do not qualify 
for disability benefits, would be entitled to broad rehabilitative support from 
their employers. The same message is also clearly pronounced in the 
slogan of the British government, “work is the best form of welfare for 
people of working age” (see the article by Peter Wright).  
From the point of view of the individual, the work-oriented disability 
policy strives to give an opportunity for employment and social participa-
tion through work. If it functions well, this policy line will strengthen the 
citizenship rights and empowerment of people with disabilities.  
However, as the OECD report states, activation approaches tend to 
benefit people already in employment much more than those who are out 
of work. A successful integration process requires that the disabled person 
is able and motivated to negotiate about his or her own life policies with 
the gate-keepers of the various activation programmes. It presupposes 
that there is some room for choice in his life situation. Those most 
vulnerable to marginalisation, for example workers with very loose labour 
market attachment, may not gain by the integrative policies. Moreover, 
people with so-called new disabilities, such as depression, exhaustion, 
ambiguous pains, and problems with learning and coping, may find their 
lives even more difficult under the pressures of activation obligations. 
From the economic point of view the justification of integration poli-
cies does not emerge from social rights; it is based on the avoidance of 
the cost of non-social policy (see Palola 2003, 224). A categorization of 
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ideal type strategies to achieve cost control reflects the relationship of the 
basic motives of disability policy reforms and activation policy. According 
to Overbye (2004) there are three ideal type strategies to achieve cost 
control in disability schemes. First there is the basic model, which means 
broad coverage accompanied by low benefits. In this model, cost control 
to some extent takes care of itself through low demand. The second 
model is the dual one: generous benefits for a core labour force but low 
benefits for marginal groups. Here the cost control is built into the rules 
limiting coverage. The third model, the encompassing model, includes 
broad coverage and generous benefits. In this model, cost control is 
exercised either through strict medical gate-keeping or extensive activa-
tion policies.   
In the Nordic countries, the encompassing model is the prevailing 
one. To avoid overtightening the restrictive, gate keeping, emphasis has 
been put on integrative measures. Cost control is thus achieved by 
avoiding the costs of non-integrative policy. Both, in Finland and Sweden, 
the latest disability pension reforms have emphasized the activation 
element.  In her article, Catarina Svärd describes the Swedish activation 
compensation – a new benefit for the young disabled.  The activities under 
this compensation aim at supporting the person’s coping abilities and 
mentally preparing him or her for entry into working life. Timo Aro dis-
cusses the integrative trends of the Finnish pension reform: the right to 
vocational rehabilitation and the efforts of early intervention by assessing 
the risk of inability to work.     
Aro further describes in his article how working life has become 
more hectic and stressful, and the threat of lay-off or unemployment is 
imminent. Mental health problems rank first as the reason for granting a 
disability pension, which, according to the OECD study, is the case in 
most other European countries, too.  
The qualitative change in inability to work – in particular the emerg-
ing of mental and psychological problems – calls for a broad concept of 
work ability. In the context of assessing work ability for benefit claims, the 
concept of work disability is based on illness. This illness-based concept 
mainly concentrates on the loss of work ability, but recently, however, a 
new and more integration-prone approach has been introduced. The 
British Personal Capability Assessment as well as the Finnish functional 
capacity approach focus on residual ability instead of emphasizing the 
incapacity.  
Yet, for the purpose of preventing inability to work, the strictly medi-
cally based concept is not sufficient. The context of prevention calls for a 
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multidimensional notion of work ability. Besides health such dimensions as 
coping and exhaustion, control over work, participation and motivation are 
needed to capture the complexity of well-being at work. A good working 
life will evolve from the interactions of these dimensions on the level of the 
worker himself, the work process, workplace community and the organiza-
tion as a whole.  
Researchers of the new EU social policy have made their first out-
lines of a new European welfare state.  Esping-Andersen and his col-
leagues search for the elements of a good society from the life cycle 
perspective of citizens (2002). The focus is on the possibilities and 
resources the society gives to the individuals.  A good society is a society 
where citizens have equal opportunities and life chances.  In disability 
policy this would mean that attention is paid not only to the integration of 
disabled persons into working life but also on the quality of working life. 
Employees’ health and well-being should be one factor when the ground 
rules of a company are decided. 
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